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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research question 
This thesis concerns legislation enacted in Belgium, the UK and within the euro zone coun-
tries. At the heart of my research is the following question: do these legislative initiatives suc-
ceed in 1) discouraging minority creditors from refusing to take part in restructuring process-
es, including debt relief initiatives, and 2) limiting creditor lawsuits against defaulting sover-
eign debtors? The thesis will also look at recent legal developments that have arisen since the 
Argentine economic crisis in 2001, and examine whether these developments are likely to 
affect the above-mentioned legislation. 
 
In order to answer the research question, the thesis will examine sovereign debt contracts (in-
cluding sovereign bonds) in the international credit market and how these are enforced within 
different jurisdictions. It will further examine how different countries seek to limit the possi-
bility of enforcing certain contract rights within their jurisdiction through national legislation. 
First, in section 1.2, the pressing issues are illustrated through a recent case.   
 
1.2 A novel litigious strategy and counter reactions 
1.2.1 Democratic Republic of Congo v. FG Hemisphere LLC 
In 1980 and 1986, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) entered into a contract 
with the Yugoslav company Energoinvest for the purpose of constructing a hydro-electric 
facility and high-tension electric transmission lines in the country.
1
 Towards the end of the 
1980s, both the government and its state-owned electricity company had defaulted on their 
debt. In 2003, two International Chamber of Commerce arbitrations, respectively in France 
and Switzerland, issued two awards requiring the DRC to repay the original loans plus 9 per 
cent interest and litigation costs. On 16 November 2004, Energoinvest sold its claims to the 
investment fund FG Hemisphere LLC at a steep discount compared to face value.
2
 After suc-
cessfully having requested that the District court of Columbia oblige the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to give detailed information on all valuable state-owned assets located anywhere in 
the world, FG Hemisphere commenced legal action against the DRC in the Bahamas, Austral-
ia, Hong Kong, Jersey, South Africa and the USA. At this point, the claims set forward 
amounted to US$125.9 million and represented principal, interest and costs.
3
 In subsequent 
litigation in November 2010, the New South Wales Supreme Court in Australia ordered the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to ‘liquidate its shares and assets in Australian mining inter-
                                                 
1
  Teresa Cheng & Adrian Lai (undated). The article refers to the cases FG Hemisphere v. DRC and Huatian-
long (2009), (2010-1) and (2010-2). 
2
  Bai (2013) 703. 
3
  ibid 703. 
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ests in order to repay FG Hemisphere’ a total amount exceeding US$31 million.4 It is as-
sumed that FG Hemisphere bought the underlying debt for US$3.3 million,
5
 making a 939 per 
cent return on the Australian suit alone.
6
  
 
By the turn of the century, the DRC was in massive debt distress, not least due to a rough po-
litical period in the country’s history. Whilst the DRC obtained independence from Belgium 
in 1960, General Mobutu Sese Seko seized power only five years later. His dictatorship lasted 
until 1997 when he was deposed in a coup d'état. The country was thereafter plunged into a 
civil war which resulted in the death of nearly 3.5 million people and came to an end in 2003.
7
 
In July 2010, around the time when FG Hemisphere was suing the DRC to obtain full pay-
ment under the original loan contract from the 1980s, the large majority of the DRC’s credi-
tors provided debt relief to the country totalling US$7251.5 million, through the enhanced 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
8
 The HIPC initiative is a debt relief initia-
tive, which was established by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 
1996, with the aim of ensuring that no country faces a debt burden it cannot manage. The 
granting of debt relief is conditional on national governments meeting a range of economic 
management and performance targets.
9
 The HIPC debt relief granted to the DRC was com-
posed of 36.3 per cent from multilateral creditors, 59.3 per cent from bilateral creditors and 
4.3 percent from commercial creditors.
10
 Following debt relief, the DRC experienced a de-
cline in gross public external debt to just over 20 per cent of GDP at the end of 2010 (from 
about 55 per cent of GDP in 2009).
11
 Today the DRC is no longer in debt distress, but it is 
still a country facing great challenges, as evidenced by its low ranking in the Human Devel-
opment Index (186
th
).
12
 
 
1.2.2 Political reactions 
The scenario described above - in which a creditor sues a defaulting sovereign debtor to ob-
tain full payment - is a result of the basic legal structure of international sovereign lending and 
borrowing. In international sovereign borrowing and lending there are no legally binding 
bankruptcy mechanisms, and the restructuring of sovereign debt is voluntary. When a sover-
eign debtor defaults on its payment obligations creditors may choose to accept a renegotiation 
                                                 
4
  ibid 704. 
5
  Madlena, O’Kane & Palast (2011).  
6
  Bai (2013) 705. 
7
   FN-sambandet (2015). 
8
  African Development Bank Group (2011) iii.  
9
   IMF (2015). 
10
  African Development Bank Group (2011) 7. 
11
  ibid 2. 
12
  United Nations Development Program (2013). 
3 
 
of the loan terms, such as prolonging the maturity of the loan, lowering the interest rate or 
granting debt relief. There is always a possibility that creditors will not participate in debt 
restructuring or renegotiate the terms of the loan agreement (this is referred to as ‘holding out’ 
from a debt restructuring). In such situations, the original terms of the loan agreement are still 
valid between the sovereign debtor and the holdout creditor. This voluntary approach to debt 
restructuring has allowed for the development of a business model. The strategy behind this 
business model consists in purchasing distressed debt on the secondary market, often at a 
steep discount, with the intent of suing or threatening to sue, in order to recover the full 
amount.
13
 Investment funds specialized in such strategies are sometimes called ‘distressed 
debt funds’ or ‘vulture funds’; the latter is a term which clearly signals ethical condemnation 
of the funds’ business practices.  
 
The dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and FG Hemisphere over defaulted 
sovereign debt is not an isolated incident. Recent academic contributions suggest that we are 
witnessing an increase in creditor litigation and ‘runs to the courthouse’.14 Even though the 
amount of litigation is rather limited, research confirms that the number of default-related 
lawsuits in New York and London has been increasing since the 1980s. The precise scope of 
the described behaviour is still not well documented, but is ‘widely regarded as a main obsta-
cle to sovereign debt restructurings and debt relief initiatives in low-income countries’.15 
 
These kinds of creditor lawsuits, some of which are carried out by so-called vulture funds, 
have caused strong reactions from a broad spectrum of international and national actors. In a 
speech to the United Nations in 2002, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK Minister of 
Finance) Gordon Brown, said: 
 
‘We particularly condemn the perversity where Vulture Funds purchase debt at a re-
duced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full amount 
owed - a morally outrageous outcome (…) 
 
Whenever a country has to defend a legal case it has to divert considerable time, atten-
tion and resources away from focusing on poverty reduction, health and education and 
we must do everything we can to stop this shameful practice.’16 
 
                                                 
13
   African Development Bank Group (undated).  
14
  Das, Papaioannou & Trebech (2012) 50. 
15
  ibid 50. 
16
  Debt Relief Bill (2010) 11. 
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At a G8 Finance Ministers meeting in 2007, the ministers expressed concern ‘about the ac-
tions of some litigating creditors’ against Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and ‘agreed to 
work together to identify measures to tackle this problem, based on the work of the Paris 
Club’ (an informal group of creditor countries).17 That same year the Paris Club made a 
commitment not to sell debt on the secondary market to creditors that refused to take part in 
debt relief initiatives. In 2008, a similar agreement was signed by the member states of the 
European Union (EU). Furthermore, signatories to the United Nations’ Doha Declaration Fi-
nancing for Development also stated that they were ‘deeply concerned about increasing vul-
ture fund litigation’ and called on ‘creditors not to sell claims on HIPC countries to creditors 
that do not participate adequately in the debt relief efforts’.18 
 
In some countries, the practice of holdout creditors has led to the enactment of legislation. 
Both Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK) have experienced creditor law suits against de-
faulting sovereigns within their own jurisdiction. In an attempt to curtail litigious creditor 
behaviour they chose to enact legislation in 2008 and 2010 respectively. In addition, in 2012, 
the euro zone countries enacted legislation aimed at preventing minority creditors from hold-
ing out from sovereign debt restructurings. The euro area legislation was not based directly on 
experiences with so-called vulture funds. However, several euro countries were (and still are) 
in a situation of debt distress and are likely to face challenging debt restructurings with possi-
ble holdout creditors.
19
 It is arguable that the choice of the euro countries to enact legislation 
is based on fear concerning the management of future debt crisis in the euro zone. 
 
My thesis will further examine these three separate legislative responses and determine 
whether they have succeeded in reaching their goals. Before turning to the examination itself, 
I will clarify some of the terminology central to the thesis and provide a more detailed de-
scription of the problem of holdout creditors in sovereign debt restructurings.  
 
1.3 Terminology 
1.3.1 Sovereign debt 
The term ‘sovereign debt’ will be used to describe all credit which a sovereign state has bor-
rowed and is under an obligation to repay to its creditors, irrespective of whether it is held in 
national or foreign currency. It refers both to debt issued and guaranteed by the government of 
                                                 
17
  ibid 13. The Bill cites a Pre-Summit meeting by G8 Finance Ministers in Germany 19. May 2007.  
18
  ibid 13. 
19
  The background for the enactment of the law in the euro zone countries may also be linked to the desire to 
avoid having to bail out other euro zone countries in debt crises. The legislation paves the way for a market-
oriented solution to sovereign debt crises making it easier for the sovereign debtor to restructure its debts 
with its creditors.  
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a sovereign state.
20
 It does not include outstanding payment obligations. Sovereign bonds 
constitute one category of sovereign debt. 
 
1.3.2 Restructuring 
There is no universally accepted definition of sovereign debt restructuring. In this thesis the 
term restructuring refers to voluntary negotiations between the sovereign borrower and its 
creditors resulting in an ‘exchange of outstanding sovereign debt instruments, such as loans or 
bonds, for new debt instruments or cash through a legal process’.21 Compared to the outstand-
ing debt instruments, the conditions in the new debt instrument usually implies extending the 
maturities of the debt, possibly lowering the interest rate and reducing of the principal amount 
to improve the sovereign lender’s capacity to repay over time. The debt reduction can be both 
indirect, through a rescheduling which defers contractual payments, or direct through debt 
relief with a reduction in the face (nominal) value of the old instruments.
22
 In this thesis, I 
focus on distressed debt restructurings, which can be defined as restructurings on terms less 
favourable to the creditor than the original bond or loan terms.
23
 When I refer to debt restruc-
turings throughout the thesis, I will normally include debt relief agreements in this category.  
 
1.3.3 Default 
Default events and debt restructurings are closely related but not identical. A default is a sit-
uation where the sovereign does not honour the original terms of the debt contract, either be-
cause it is unwilling or unable to do so.
24
 This normally consists in the failure of a govern-
ment to make a principal or interest payment in due time (beyond a possible grace period).
25
  
 
1.3.4 Holdout Creditors 
A holdout creditor is a creditor who chooses not to participate in a sovereign debt restructur-
ing. There are various types of holdout creditors and, as will be described in section 1.4.2, 
there are several legitimate reasons for creditors to hold out from restructuring processes. In 
my thesis I focus on minority creditors who refuse to take part in a sovereign debt restructur-
ing accepted by the majority of the creditors, and who claim payment in accordance with the 
original terms of the loan contract. More aggressive types of minority holdout creditors are 
known by some as ‘vulture funds’. The main strategy of a vulture fund is to ‘buy sovereign 
debt instruments when a country is most vulnerable (defaulted or soon-to default sovereign 
                                                 
20
  Das, Papaioannou & Trebech (2012) 7.  
21
  ibid 7.  
22
  ibid 7.  
23
  This definition is in line with the one provided by Standard & Poor, see ibid 7.  
24
  Borensaztein & Panizza (2008) 3. 
25
  ibid 8. 
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debt), which enables the funds to purchase the debt at a deep discount from its face value and 
attempt to enforce the full claims’,26 often through litigation in court.  
 
1.4 Context and delimitations 
1.4.1 Advantages of sovereign borrowing and reasons to restructure sovereign debt 
If used well, sovereign borrowing is an instrument that can contribute to economic and social 
development and help achieve economic stability in a country.
27
 Almost all states borrow, 
either to promote development, to invest in infrastructure, to fund warfare or just to ensure 
payment balance at all times. Unfortunately, some states default on their payment obligations. 
There are many reasons why countries default and end up in debt crisis: poor economic man-
agement, external economic shocks, civil wars, natural disasters and more. Even so, creditors 
do not avoid all investments that entail risks and do not fully hedge against a breach of con-
tract (a default). To invest is to take risks, and risks are normally priced into the interest rate 
and premium of the investment.  
 
The causes behind sovereign default are not the subject of this thesis. Instead, the thesis will 
focus on existing situations of debt crisis in which the sovereign debtor tries to resolve the 
crisis. A common tool used to resolve a debt crisis is to restructure the sovereign debt. As 
previously explained, a restructuring is a voluntary agreement between the sovereign debtor 
and the creditors, which normally involves extending the maturity of the loan, lowering the 
interest rate and sometimes reducing the nominal amount (debt relief). Debt restructuring will 
always be positive for the debtor country’s economy because it means credit on better terms. 
On the other hand, when a sovereign debtor defaults or initiates a restructuring, it implies a 
loss for the creditors. However, in times of crisis where the sovereign is in economic distress, 
it can be beneficial for the creditors to accept a restructuring of the debt, as this may give the 
sovereign time to ‘change policies and turn around its economy, allowing eventually greater 
payments to the group of all creditors than if the sovereign simply defaulted’.28   
 
There is also an ethical dimension to the question of why a state should be able to restructure 
its debts and why creditors should accept a restructuring offer. A sovereign debtor is after all a 
state with certain fiduciary responsibilities towards its citizens. In times of crisis, regardless of 
the causes, many will argue that there should be limits to how long a creditor can demand 
payment in accordance with the contract when the basic needs of citizens are not being met.  
 
                                                 
26
  Blackman & Muki (2010) 49, note 6. 
27
  Li & Panizza (2011) 15. 
28
   Choi, Declaration (2012) 7 -8. 
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1.4.2 Challenges  
For a restructuring to be optimal – minimising the overall losses for the parties involved – it 
must be strictly necessary, and the restructuring offer made to the creditors must be neither 
overestimated nor underestimated. To ensure that all parties are willing to agree to a restruc-
turing agreement, it is important that no one feels that the other parties involved are free rid-
ing on their own losses: the debtor state must show willingness to make structural economic 
changes (cuts in their national budgets, raise more taxes etc.) and all creditors must accept 
losses in the restructuring process, whether in the form of lower interest rates, prolonged ma-
turity or sometimes even debt forgiveness.  
 
Although an offer to restructure may be beneficial to the group of creditors, an individual 
creditor may nonetheless profit by ‘demanding a disproportionately greater payment than the 
amount received by the rest of the creditors in a restructuring’.29 For this reason, some credi-
tors refuse to participate in restructurings (holdout creditors) and threaten to sue or actually 
sue, in order to receive payment in accordance with the terms of the original loan agreement. 
Such holdout strategies, and especially the more aggressive strategy including litigation, have 
several negative consequences on the sovereign debt market: 
 
- Reduced poverty reduction and slower economic recovery: Holdout creditors and sov-
ereign debt lawsuits threaten the objectives of debt relief initiatives (such as the HIPC-
initiative) by reducing the impact of debt relief for the countries concerned.
30
 Holdout 
creditors also reduce the economic effects of a restructuring, which may result in a 
slower economic recovery for the debtor country. 
 
- Taxpayer backlash: When the impact of sovereign debt restructurings or debt relief is 
reduced due to certain actors free riding, there is a danger of so-called ‘taxpayers 
backlash’.31 When taxpayers realize that their taxes meant for debt relief, are in fact 
being used to pay claims from holdout creditors, they may become reluctant to support 
                                                 
29
  ibid 8. 
30
  The total cost of providing debt relief to the 39 countries that have been found eligible or potentially eligible 
for debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative was estimated to be about US$74 billion (in end-2012 net 
present value terms). Approximately 44 per cent of the funding comes from the IMF and other multilateral 
institutions and the remaining amount comes from bilateral creditors. The IMF states that smaller multilat-
eral institutions, non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors, and commercial creditors, account for about 
26 per cent of total HIPC Initiative costs. These creditors have only delivered a small share of their expected 
relief so far. Non–Paris Club bilateral creditors as have delivered around 47 per cent of their share of HIPC 
Initiative debt relief. One third of these creditors have not delivered any relief at all. See more at: IMF 
(2015). 
31
  African Development Bank Group (undated). 
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their government’s participation in future sovereign debt restructurings, debt relief ini-
tiatives, development aid programs etc.  
 
- Hold-out and litigation costs: Creditors hold out from debt restructurings in order to 
force the debtor to repay in full.
32
 This holdout behaviour makes the restructuring pro-
cess more difficult, dragging it out and creating uncertainty for all parties involved.
33
 
The result is often increased costs for both the sovereign debtor in economic distress 
and the remaining creditors. The litigation process is also costly for a sovereign debt-
or, draining money and work force away from other important policy and development 
issues. When a holdout creditor obtaines a court ruling in its favour (stating that the 
sovereign creditor must pay the holdout creditor in full), it exerts pressure on the sov-
ereign debtor by attempting to seize the sovereign debtor’s assets abroad. Such pro-
ceedings are always burdensome to the debtors concerned: it may cost millions in le-
gal expenses and can complicate financial and reserve management, because the debt-
or country must avoid placing valuables where they can be seized. Furthermore, if the 
practice of minority creditors holding out from restructurings becomes widespread, it 
may result in non-holdout creditors taking this possibility into account in their risk 
calculations, so increasing lending costs.  
 
- Inequitable burden sharing amongst creditors: When creditors hold out from sover-
eign debt restructurings, the debtor country may have to pay more to the holdout credi-
tor than to the creditors participating in the restructuring, either through holdout litiga-
tion or due to the threat of such action. While creditors agreeing to the restructuring 
agreement take their share of the losses connected to a debt crisis, holdout creditors 
become free riders.  
 
- Restructuring incentives: If holdout creditors succeed in their holdout strategy, it is 
likely that other creditors will become reluctant to accept future restructurings. When 
other creditors realise that a holdout creditor seeking to make more individually, they 
will be tempted to adopt the same strategy. The higher the price demanded in a re-
structuring process and the greater the number of creditors that choose to hold out, the 
more difficult it is to successfully conclude a sovereign debt restructuring.
34
 The IMF 
has stated that ‘debt restructurings have often been too little and too late, thus failing 
                                                 
32
  As previously mentioned, the restructuring only binds the participating creditors and does not change the 
legal obligations laid down in the contract between the sovereign debtor and holdout creditors.  
33
  African Development Bank Group (2011).  
34
  Choi, Declaration (2012) 8. 
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to re-establish debt sustainability and market access in a durable way’.35 The loss of 
incentives to restructure can further increase the costs of a debt crisis, making it harder 
for the debtor country’s economy to recover.  
 
It is important to note that there are legitimate reasons for refusing to participate in a restruc-
turing process. It is easy to argue that it is reasonable to hold out if the sovereign debtor is 
giving unjustified differential treatment to creditors in the restructuring agreement, or is abu-
sively asking creditors to accept excessive losses. Further, it is of course a relevant concern 
that it may become too easy for the sovereign borrower to obtain debt restructuring.
36
 Such a 
situation constitutes a moral hazard and would be suboptimal because it increases creditors’ 
losses and makes it more expensive for the sovereign to borrow in the future. There are also 
arguments in favour of the more aggressive litigious holdout strategy. This line of argument 
focuses on the integrity of contracts, the wellbeing of the financial market, and the fact that 
litigious creditors have a corrective effect on a market where in which it is all too easy for 
sovereigns to get access to credit and to default.
37
 I fully acknowledge the importance of lim-
iting the incentives for hazardous behaviour when it comes to over borrowing and the misuse 
of restructurings that causes damaging losses for their creditors. However, my thesis will con-
centrate on the challenge posed by minority creditors holding out from restructurings and so 
free riding on the losses of both the sovereign debtor and the majority of the creditors, which 
threatens the goal of voluntary sovereign debt restructurings. This is also in line with the aims 
of the UK, Belgium and euro zone legislative initiatives mentioned in the previous section, 
which I will examine further in chapter 3. 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis and methodology  
As noted in section 1.1, this thesis will examine whether the legislation enacted in Belgium, 
the UK and within the euro zone countries succeeds in its aims of limiting 1) the ability of 
                                                 
35
  IMF (2013). 
36
   Many academics have discussed this moral hazard. Here is just one example of the general line of argument:   
‘Much of the debate surrounding possible changes to (or reform of) the institutions governing sovereign 
debt restructuring has been aimed at reducing the costs (in terms of both time and other resources) associ-
ated with reaching agreement as to the terms of that restructuring. While this appears to be in the best inter-
ests of a sovereign country that is already in default, it is important to note that reductions in the costs of de-
fault will also affect the incentives of the country to borrow appropriately and avoid default in the future. In 
turn, this will affect the terms on which creditors will lend to the sovereign. That is, it is entirely possible 
that the country in default may be made worse off through the introduction of a relatively costless debt re-
structuring process if this process significantly limits their ability to borrow in the future.’ See Wright 
(2011) 6. 
37
  The secondary market for debt obligations that enables the vulture funds’ operation is often said to be a 
fundamental feature of sovereign borrowing and lending; when creditors can freely ‘sell the debt they hold 
on the secondary market, there is less risk involved in lending to sovereigns, and creditors are therefore more 
likely to provide the capital sovereigns need’. See African Development Bank Group (undated).  
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creditors to hold out from restructuring processes, including debt relief initiatives, and 2) 
creditor lawsuits against defaulting sovereign debtors.  
 
To understand the behaviour of holdout creditors, and national legislative responses, it is es-
sential to understand the legal environment in which sovereign lending and borrowing oper-
ate. In Chapter 2, I will describe the legal framework for sovereign lending and defaults, in-
cluding some basic explanations of the process of litigating a claim against a defaulting sov-
ereign debtor. In describing this legal environment, I will to a certain extent try to detach it 
from a specific jurisdiction and instead focus on the current international trends. This more 
general examination of legal tendencies and legal developments within the sphere of sover-
eign lending and borrowing will be based on case law and national legislation from Western 
countries deemed important in commercial and financial matters. In addition, I will refer to 
legal scholars who have analysed these legal developments.  
 
Throughout the thesis there will be an overrepresentation of examples from New York and 
English legislation and case law. My justification for this is that the laws of England and New 
York are those in which international sovereign bonds are most commonly issued (see figure 
1 below). They are estimated to represent approximately 48 per cent and 40 per cent respec-
tively of the notional amount of outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds.
38
  
 
Figure 1: Total number of bond issues by governing law 39  
 
 
  
Chapter 2 will also look into the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which is an important public 
law feature found in the legal framework of sovereign lending. The topic is well covered by 
                                                 
38
  IMF (2014) 6. 
39
  Bradley & Gulati (2013) 12. 
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case law, national legislation and by legal scholars.
40
 When presenting the content of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in the context of sovereign debt litigation, I will build on the 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (‘the 
UN Convention on Immunities’). Though not yet in effect, the convention is largely consid-
ered to express current customary international law.
41
 I will however complement the presen-
tation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity with examples of legislation and case law from 
the USA and UK (especially England).  
 
Chapter 3 will present three legislative initiatives, each of which intends to improve the incen-
tives for creditors to take part in restructuring processes and prevent litigious creditors from 
obtaining full repayment under the original non-restructured loan agreement. I will examine 
legislation from Belgium, the United Kingdom and the euro zone countries. The legislative 
acts have different preparatory histories and rationales, which will be explained before the 
content of the legislation itself is presented. When presenting the legislation I will rely on the 
original legal provisions analysed in the context of the preparatory documents and legislative 
history. I will further discuss to what extent the three legislative initiatives have succeeded in 
providing incentives for creditors to participate in restructurings and in limiting the negative 
consequences of creditors holding out from debt restructurings. I will close the chapter by 
comparing the different legislative initiatives and discussing whether there remains a lack of 
incentives to take part in restructurings, such that holdouts and subsequent creditor litigation 
may still be commonplace. Unfortunately, existing legislation is relatively new and there is 
little case law to shed light on the different approaches. Furthermore, there is little research on 
the actual impact of the legislation, regarding for example the number of creditors holding out 
from restructuring or the number of creditors litigating for full payment. It is beyond the time 
frame of this thesis to collect such data and provide empirical evidence of the effects of legis-
lation. For these reasons, I have chosen to keep the analysis of the legislation more general 
and theoretical. At the very end of chapter 3, I will however consider some empirical data on 
sovereign debt restructurings between 1950 and 2010. This will allow me to test the conclu-
sions of the general analysis, and will shed light on the question of or not there is a real need – 
in practice - for stronger regulations to ensure successful sovereign debt restructurings.   
 
Chapter 4 will look into recent legal developments within the sphere of sovereign lending that 
are likely to affect sovereign debt restructurings and disputes in the future. The starting point 
will be the Argentine default in 2001, because the legal developments - which I will examine -
are connected to the outcome of legal proceedings which emerged in the aftermath of the 
                                                 
40
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41
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country’s restructurings in 2005 and 2010. The legal developments which will be examined 
are 1) a novel interpretation of the so-called pari passu clause often found in sovereign bonds; 
2) an injunction issued to ensure compliance with the pari passu order; and 3) the possibility 
that the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) will accept juris-
diction over disputes related to sovereign debt contracts (sovereign bonds). I will thereafter 
discuss how the legislation in Belgium, the UK and in the euro area, will react to these recent 
legal developments, and whether further incentives are needed to ensure sufficient participa-
tion in future sovereign debt restructurings.  
 
The subject of the thesis draws upon several legal disciplines and lies at the crossroads be-
tween international contract law, international private law, international public law, national 
public law and politics. Since the spectrum of relevant sources of law is broad, one of the 
main challenges is to explore the intersections between these legal disciplines.  
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2 The legal framework of sovereign lending, defaults and 
restructurings 
The aim of this chapter is to establish the content of the law applicable to sovereign lending 
and borrowing. This is necessary both in order to 1) understand the motivations behind hold-
out behaviour and the litigious strategies of some sovereign creditors, and 2) examine whether 
the legislative acts of Belgium, the UK and the euro zone countries succeed in their aim of 
limiting the negative consequences of holdout behaviour. In the following I will present the 
main legal features of sovereign lending, defaults, restructurings and sovereign debt litigation. 
 
2.1 The Private Law Contract 
Sovereign states, much like private persons and private corporations, acquire credit through 
contracts, which confer rights and impose obligations on the respective parties.  A sovereign 
state can obtain finance through lending from private banks, states, international finance insti-
tution but also through the issuance of sovereign bonds. 
 
Sovereign states are subjects of public international law, a branch of law that regulates the 
relationship between states. States are sovereign, and are therefore free to regulate their inter-
nal affairs through legislation and the exercise of judicial functions.
42
 However, a state does 
not act as a sovereign when it engages in commercial activity. The contracting of sovereign 
debt is made by virtue of the country’s private autonomy. In other words, loans contracted by 
states or state-related entities, including financial operations involving the issuance of bonds, 
constitute transactions of a private nature and are in principle subject to the rules governing 
commercial loans. This was also established in France v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (1929): ‘Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as sub-
jects of international law is based on the municipal law of some country’. 43  
 
2.2 Private International Contract Law and Party Autonomy 
In establishing that the loan agreements of sovereign states are subject to private law, ques-
tions arise as to which court/ tribunal has jurisdiction to handle a sovereign debt dispute; what 
laws should apply to the debt contract; and which procedural laws should be followed. The 
answer is found in private international law, which is the area of law that regulates the choice 
of the governing law. Within private international law, conflict rules or choice-of-law rules 
seek to identify the laws governing international relationships.
44
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  Cordero-Moss (2014) 5. 
43
  France v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1929) paragraph 86.  
44
  Cordero-Moss (2014) 134. 
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When using the term ‘international’ in the context of private international law, I do not refer 
to international sources of law. Rather, the law is defined as ‘international’ because the object 
that the law regulates is international.
45
 National law and international conventions have dif-
ferent definitions of the term ‘international’; one could therefore say that the definition ‘varies 
according to the criteria used by the interpreter’.46  For example, the Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods of 1980
 47
 is designed precisely for international circum-
stances, and Article 1(1) specifies that: ‘This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods 
between parties whose places of business are in different States’. On the other hand, the 
Hague Convention on the Law applicable to the International Sale of Goods of 1955
48
 sheds a 
different light on the definition of ‘international’ (without actually stating it). According to 
Article 1 of the Convention, the mere declaration by the parties is not sufficient to give a sale 
an international character. Thus, the Article indicates that a sale may be international ‘if there 
are some foreign elements to the transaction, but that this is not necessarily the place of busi-
ness of the parties’.49 The European Union Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations
50
 regulates the choice of law for the EU. Article 1 (1) of the Regulation 
describes any situation involving a conflict between laws of different states as falling under its 
scope. This way the Article indirectly ‘opens the door even for the eventuality that the only 
foreign element to a transaction is the choice made by the parties of a foreign law…’51  
 
Sovereign debt contracts usually carry with them several international features. For example, 
the parties to a loan contract or a sovereign bond are often domiciled in two different jurisdic-
tions, meaning that the investor does not have his habitual residence in the debtor country. 
Further, many sovereign debt contracts (including sovereign bonds) are not subject to the law 
of the sovereign’s jurisdiction, but typically to a law of an outside jurisdiction, to immunise 
the contract from later national legislation that can lead to changes in the contract. In sover-
eign debt disputes, the question of whether the contract is of international character or not, 
and whether international private law is relevant, is not normally disputed.  
 
More often disputes concerning sovereign debt turn on 1) the question of which law shall 
govern the sovereign debt contract and 2) which court actually has jurisdiction over a sover-
eign debt dispute. The law governing the contract must be identified by the conflict rules of 
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  Cordero-Moss (2013) 19.  
46
  See Cordero-Moss (2014) 3. 
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  CISG (1980). 
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  The Hauge Convention (1955). 
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  Cordero-Moss (2014) 3. 
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  ibid 4. 
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the ‘state where the court where the action is brought has its venue’ (lex fori).52 Each state has 
its own conflict of law rules. Some of the national choice-of-law rules are of international 
origin, and their sources are found in supranational regulation and are applicable in a state via 
for example international conventions ratified by that state.
53
 Some national choice-of-law 
rules are contained in national legislation, such as the Norwegian Act on the Law Applicable 
to Insurance Agreements of 1992, an act regulating choice of law in a specific sector.
54
 Other 
choice-of-law rules are customary or based on judicial precedents, as is the case of most Nor-
wegian private international law.
55
 In contractual matters, private international law is general-
ly dominated by the principle of party autonomy, recognized as a conflict of law-rule in the 
vast majority of states participating in international trade and business.
56
 It follows that the 
parties to a contract are free to choose the law governing their relationship, or in other words, 
to choose what law(s) the court or tribunal shall apply to each aspect of the dispute. The par-
ties to the contract can also choose the forum where the parties want future disputes to be 
dealt with. This can be regulated in a forum selection clause which refers to a particular court 
in a jurisdiction agreed upon and/or to a specific kind of dispute resolution, such as mediation 
or arbitration. Modern lending agreements and sovereign bond contracts usually contain both 
governing law clauses and forum selection clauses to ensure that only one specific court is 
given the task of interpreting the contract terms, applying one (or several) specific set(s) of 
rules.  
 
Despite the fact that it is possible to choose the governing law and the forum, conflicts over 
these questions still arise. This can be partly explained by the fact that conflict of law-rules 
differ between countries and may therefore determine that different laws govern the same 
relationship.
57
 Furthermore, the conditions for exercising party autonomy may vary according 
to the private international law rules in each state.
58
 These issues of restriction on - and condi-
tions for - the exercise of party autonomy (such as ordre pubclic), are thoroughly discussed 
elsewhere and
 
will not be addressed in this thesis.
59
 I will mainly concentrate on circumstanc-
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es where the parties’ choice of law does not conflict with national regulations, and where the 
contracting parties’ choice of law is upheld.60  
 
2.3 Disputes arising from the Sovereign Debt Contract 
2.3.1 Sovereign ‘Bankruptcy Law’ 
When discussing the legal framework of sovereign debt, it is important to remember that, con-
trary to private defaults, there is no national or international bankruptcy procedure that can 
ensure an orderly restructuring of the debt of a ‘bankrupt’ sovereign.61 Many suggestions for 
an orderly bankruptcy or restructuring procedure have been made, at least since the time of 
Adam Smith.
62
 As yet, no international system for a comprehensive sovereign debt restructur-
ing procedure has been adopted.
63
 When a sovereign state is unable to meet its obligations, it 
is currently the sovereign debtor’s responsibility to enter into voluntary negotiations with its 
creditors - a mixture of public and private entities with disparate agendas - and to seek ac-
ceptable restructuring of its debts.
64
 But a creditor may choose to hold out, rather than accept 
a voluntary restructuring. When a creditor holds out from a restructuring process, it is a means 
of exerting pressure on the debtor to make sure it fulfils its commitments according to the 
contract, or at least improves the restructuring offer. If the sovereign debtor does not fulfil its 
obligations according to the contract but defaults on its non-restructured obligations, the hold-
out creditor may choose to bring litigation to uphold its rights under the contract. 
 
2.3.2 Judgment on the Merits and Enforcement   
If a holdout creditor wants to uphold his rights under the original contract, it is first necessary 
to obtain a judgment on the merits, confirming the creditor’s claim. The holdout creditor will 
                                                 
60
  One exception to this is the discussion in chapter 4.3, on the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in sovereign debt litigation. 
61
  In reality there is no such thing as a bankrupt state, but the term usually refers to a sovereign state in eco-
nomic distress who defaults on payment obligations. 
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  Blackman & Mukhi (2010) note 6 citing Adam Smith’s The Wealth of nations: ‘When it becomes necessary 
for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to 
do so, a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both the least dishonorable to the 
debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor’. 
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  Amongst more recent suggestions are the global sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) suggested 
by IMF management. See, e.g., Krueger (2002) and IMF (2002). Furthermore, the establishment of a Debt 
Workout Mechanism has been suggested by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) See UNCTAD (undated). The IMF suggestion was rejected in the early 2000s, and up until now 
there has been little political will to work towards a comprehensive international debt restructuring proce-
dure. On 8 September 2014, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution mandating the 
UN to work on a multilateral legal framework for debt restructuring. This may be an indication of changing 
mentality towards a so-called statutory approach, but as of now, the USA and the vast majority of European 
countries are boycotting the process. See Nicols (2014).   
64
  Different informal institutions such as the Paris Club (for official sovereign lenders) and the London Club 
(for private lenders) have gathered to safeguards their interests in cases of restructuring.  
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normally seize the court agreed upon in the contract, in accordance with the principle of party 
autonomy in private international law, as explained in the previous section. If the plaintiff (the 
holder of the payment claim) obtains a judgment on the merits stating e.g. that the sovereign 
debtor must repay the loan, interest and legal costs, the next question is how to execute this 
judgment and attach the property of the judgment debtor.
65
 All developed jurisdictions pro-
vide methods for the enforcement of a judgment through execution of the debtor’s property.66 
An order from a court to seize specific property is often called an attachment, and is used both 
as a pre-trial provisional remedy and to enforce a final judgment. Courts may attach debtors' 
property to help pay their creditors, ‘either by directly transferring the property to the credi-
tors, or by selling it and giving the creditors the proceeds’.67 As will be explained in section 
2.4, the procedure of attachment is often more complex in cases involving attachment of sov-
ereign states’ property.  
 
Within the context of sovereign creditor litigation, one of the challenges for a creditor holding 
a payment order is to find attachable objects: the sovereign judgment debtor may not have 
sufficient assets within the jurisdiction where proceedings have taken place, and other attach-
able property may be placed all around the world. In this situation, it is important to know 
whether the obtained court order/judgment is directly enforceable in other jurisdictions, such 
that the holder of the judgment may follow the borrower’s assets into those jurisdictions. The 
judicial effects of a legal proceeding only have direct effect within the confines of the national 
jurisdiction, and it is universally true that a lender cannot enforce a judgment directly in a 
third country.
68
 However, bilateral agreements and international treaties such as the Lugano 
Convention,
69
 the Brussels I Regulation
70
 and the New York Convention
71
 have facilitated 
freer movement particularly of money judgements, between jurisdictions. Such agreements 
and conventions ensure that a national court will enforce a judgment or an arbitral award 
made within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties.
72
 There are however several 
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different agreements and conventions, and countries may sign different agreements or none at 
all. For these reasons, the enforcement of foreign judgments may still vary between countries 
and be subject to different conditions and restrictions. These restrictions and conditions will 
not be investigated in this thesis. A further type of restriction on the possibility to litigate and 
enforce sovereign debt contracts will, however, be discussed in the following section. This is 
the restriction connected to the doctrine of state immunity, which limits the normal procedure 
of litigation described in this section. 
 
2.4 Sovereign Immunity 
2.4.1 General introduction 
Sovereign debt litigators benefit from the free(r) movement of money judgments from one 
jurisdiction to another, facilitated by bilateral agreements and international agreements such 
as the Lugano Convention, the Brussels I Regulation and the New York Convention. However 
sovereign debt litigators are at the same time constrained by public international law. As Dr 
Michael Waibel states: 
 
‘The topic of sovereign defaults lies at the intersection of private and public interna-
tional law. When creditors enforce sovereign debt obligations, the cases represent an 
exclusively private character, at least at first sight. […] The presence of the sovereign 
debtor transforms such a dispute into one of a very particular kind. Disputes arising 
out of sovereign default are of a hybrid character and implicate important question of 
public international law. Most sovereign defaults cannot be settled satisfactorily purely 
on the basis of contract law.’73 
 
One of the public international law features that Waibel refers to here is the sovereign-
immunity rules. There are two categories of sovereign-immunity protection for foreign states: 
1) immunity from jurisdiction and 2) immunity from execution. Immunity from jurisdiction 
refers to a ‘limitation of the adjudicatory power of national courts, whereas immunity from 
execution restricts the enforcement powers of national courts or other organs’.74 This concept 
of state immunity covers both the state as such and its property. The immunity which one 
sovereign grants another in its own courts has traditionally been justified under the principle of 
state sovereignty. According to the principle of sovereignty in international law, no state is to 
be subject to the will of another state. This is connected to the principle of equality, and sug-
gests that all states enjoy the same rank. Sovereign immunity can be seen as a manifestation 
of these two principles, and they may explain why it is deemed inappropriate for a sovereign 
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state to be sued in the national courts of another sovereign state.
75
 A more functional explana-
tion of sovereign immunity is that states are equal subjects of governance with exclusive 
power within a defined territory, and that the courts of one state should not be able to test the 
validity or legitimacy of another State’s exercise of authority within its own territory.76 Some 
legal scholars have also noted that state immunity in practice was probably based on ‘the ex-
pedient of gaining reciprocity and because judicial actions caused diplomatic antagonism’.77 
While these justifications mainly concern immunity from jurisdiction, immunity from execu-
tion provisions are said to stem more directly from concerns about the disruption and political 
ramifications that can result from the seizure of a foreign state’s property.78 
 
Sovereign states have long been privileged subjects of international law: prior to the twentieth 
century there were few countries in the world that permitted their courts to process claims 
brought by private citizens against foreign sovereigns.
79
 However, as states became increas-
ingly involved in ordinary commercial activities, the maintenance of sovereign immunity was 
perceived to be unjust treatment of private contractors. Today, most commercially significant 
jurisdictions subscribe to the ‘restrictive’ theory of sovereign immunity. The argument for a 
more restrictive approach is that when a ‘sovereign descends to the market place, he must 
accept the sanctions of the market place’.80 In the following section I will consider the sources 
of law related to the doctrine of restrictive state immunity. Thereafter I will examine the con-
tent of the doctrine of sovereign immunity itself. 
 
2.4.2 The sources of law  
At the national level, the transition to the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity happened 
in the French Cour de Cassation in 1969, in the US Supreme Court in 1976 and in the English 
Court of Appeal in 1977.
81
 Later, the doctrine of restrictive state immunity was laid down in 
US and UK law, in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
82
 and the State Immunity 
Act (SIA) 1978
83
 respectively. At the international level, there was no authoritative source for 
the doctrine of restrictive immunity prior to 2004, so it had to be ‘derived from international 
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custom as evidence in treaties, national legislation, court decisions and other State practice’.84 
In 1997, the International Law Commission, a specialised agency of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, undertook a study of the law of state immunity based on all these sources. 
The International Law Commission finalized its Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and their Property in 1991 and concluded that there was a ‘steady trend, with the excep-
tion of the People’s Republic of China, towards all States accepting a restrictive doctrine and 
framed its draft Articles on that basis’.85 In 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted the Con-
vention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (‘the UN Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities’/ ‘the Convention’), based on the 1991 International Law Commis-
sion Draft Articles. The Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities has not yet entered into 
force, but as of October 2014 it has been signed by 28 parties, including countries such as 
China, India, Japan, Iran, The Russian Federation, Switzerland and most of the members of 
the European Community including France and the UK. 16 countries have ratified the Con-
vention, including Austria, Finland, France, Iran, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Saudi Ara-
bia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
86
 Though not yet in effect, the Convention is largely 
considered to express current customary international law.
87
 When presenting the content of 
the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity in the context of sovereign debt litigation, I will 
build on the UN Convention and complement it with legislation and case law mainly from the 
USA and England.   
 
2.4.3 Immunity from Jurisdiction 
The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities regulates to what extent states and their 
property enjoy immunity from suit in the national courts of other sovereign states, and im-
munity from enforcement in connection with such lawsuits. Article 5 lays down the starting 
point by stating that a Sovereign state enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, 
from the jurisdiction of the courts of another State. This is also the starting point of the US 
FSIA section 1604, and the UK SIA section 1(1). 
 
Under the modern ‘restrictive’ theory of sovereign immunity, which the UN Convention in-
tends to codify, a foreign state’s immunity is subject to various exceptions, the extent of 
which is often at the heart of sovereign-litigation disputes.
88
 One important exception to the 
immunity from jurisdiction is laid down in Article 7 of the UN Convention, and provides the 
state the opportunity to give express consent for jurisdiction to be exercised in proceedings 
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before a court of another state. Express consent can be given through an international agree-
ment, a written contract, or by declaration before the court in specific proceedings. A similar 
exception to sovereign immunity from jurisdiction based on state consent is also provided for 
in the US FSIA section 1605 and the UK SIA section 2(1) and 2(2).  
 
Another important exception, which is relevant in the context of sovereign debt contracts, is 
set out in the UN Convention Article 10, and provides a general exception from immunity in 
relation to ‘commercial transactions’. By ‘commercial transactions’ the UN Convention refers 
to the distinction between the public acts of the government of a state (jure imperii) and its 
commercial acts (jure gestionis) (see Article 2(2)).
89
 In other words, courts will arrest suit 
only where the activity is of a governmental nature. Precisely which activities are to be char-
acterized as governmental in nature (as opposed to jure gestionis) is still under debate and 
varies between jurisdictions, but positions seem to be a converging towards an agreement that 
the correct test is to consider what constitutes the ‘nature’ of the activity. Consequently, alt-
hough an act may have a public purpose, ‘recourse to private means to achieve it will lead the 
courts to treat it as a commercial act and therefor the state will not be immunized’.90 The US 
FSIA also accepts jurisdiction over foreign states when the action concerns different commer-
cial activities carried out by the foreign state (1605(a)(2)). US FSIA section 1603(d) provides 
that ‘the commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of 
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose’. 
Several court cases in the United States have examined what is meant by the ‘nature of the 
act’, which may also shed light on the interpretation of the UN Convention. To determine the 
nature of a sovereign’s act, the court usually asks whether the particular actions that the for-
eign state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a pri-
vate party engages in trade and traffic or commerce.
91
 The courts often start by examining the 
act of the foreign sovereign that serves as a basis for the plaintiffs claim. In Republic of Ar-
gentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court concluded that when a sovereign purchases goods in 
the market, it has engaged in a commercial activity because such a purchase is ‘the type of 
action […] by which a private party engages in trade and traffic or commerce’.92 The Su-
preme Court further held that ‘a state engages in commercial activity… where it exercises 
only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens, as distinct from those powers 
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peculiar to sovereigns’.93 Section 1(a) of the UK SIA provides that a state is not immune as 
respects proceedings relating to a commercial transaction entered into by a state. Section 3(3) 
further defines the content of ‘commercial transaction’ by listing core business activities in 
subsections 3(3)(a) and (b). The SIA does not manage to avoid the distinction between public 
and commercial completely, as section 3(3)(c) states that a commercial transaction also means 
‘any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, professional 
or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than in 
the exercise of sovereign authority’.94   
 
An exception to the exception from immunity from jurisdiction is found in Article 10(2) of 
the UN Convention, which provides that immunity can still be invoked in cases of commer-
cial transaction between states if the parties to the commercial transaction have expressly 
agreed so. This is also accepted under the UK SIA section 3(2).  
 
With respect to sovereign debt, it seems to be an international consensus that borrowing is a 
commercial act due to its commercial nature and therefore not immune as such, even if the 
proceeds are to be used for a government purpose. The evidence for such consensus is found 
both in legislation and in the many court cases regarding sovereign debt disputes around the 
world.
95
 What is deemed more problematic – and this is often at heart of sovereign-debt dis-
putes - is the question of which assets must be considered immune from enforcement 
measures.   
 
2.4.4 Immunity from Enforcement Measures 
Article 18 -21 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities regulate state immunity 
from measures of constraint in connection with proceedings before a court of another state. 
Articles 18 and 19 speak only of a ‘proceeding before a court of another State’, which refers 
to the court of a state where the specific property is situated, regardless of the state in which  
the main proceedings are or have been taking place.
96
 
 
The introductory phrases of articles 18 and 19 embody the general principle of State immuni-
ty from measures of constraint and the following subparagraphs lay down the exceptions to 
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that principle. The convention distinguishes between pre-judgement (Article 18) and post-
judgment measures (Article 19) of constraint, but the starting point is that the State enjoys 
immunity from enforcement measures in both cases. The concrete measures of constraint 
available vary from state to state, and the term ‘measures of constraint’ is meant to encompass 
a broad spectrum of measures (the list of alternatives is not exhaustive).
97
 The most important 
measures in respect of litigation against sovereign debtor states, may well be the measures 
ensuring execution of the judgment (post-judgment), such as the attachment of certain proper-
ty.
98
   
 
With respect to immunity from enforcement measures, the US FSIA is similar to the UN 
Convention: the starting point in section 1609 is that the property of a foreign state present in 
the United States is immune from execution, including of course execution in satisfaction of a 
debt.
99
 Furthermore, such property may only be attached and executed upon when one of the 
exceptions in sections 1610 or 1611 applies. The UK SIA section 13(2)(b) also provides that a 
foreign State enjoys immunity from enforcement measures. A study by August Reinisch, Pro-
fessor of International and European Law at the University of Vienna, has examined Europe-
an court practice related to enforcement immunity, and concludes that it is far from uniform. 
Nevertheless, the study argues that certain common principles have emerged over the last 
decades, and that these principles are reflected in recent codification in the UN Convention.
100
 
In the following section, I will examine the exceptions to immunity from enforcement 
measures. 
   
2.4.4.1 Exception due to waiver of immunity 
As with immunity from jurisdiction, the UN Convention accepts that immunity from en-
forcement measures may be waived by the state. This is clearly reflected in Articles 18 and 19 
of the UN Convention, which state that a State can expressly consent to waive its immunity 
from measures of constraint by international agreement, in a written contract or by a declara-
tion before a court after a dispute between the parties has arisen. According to Articles 18(b) 
and 19(b) a state is also deemed to have waived its immunity in respect of specific assets if it 
has allocated or earmarked property for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of the 
proceedings. It is important to point out that a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction does not 
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encompass a waiver of immunity from enforcement. This is clearly stated in Article 20 of the 
UN Convention. In the USA, the FSIA section 1610(1) provides that property in the USA 
belonging to a foreign state and ‘used for a commercial activity in the US, shall not be im-
mune from attachment… or from execution if …the foreign state has waived its immunity 
from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by implication’. 
Subsections 1610(a)(1) and (d)(1) regulate cases of post-judgment and pre-judgement attach-
ments. The UK SIA section 13(3) provides a similar exception to immunity from certain en-
forcement measures through the written consent of the State concerned.  
 
2.4.4.2 Exception for Non-commercial Purposes / Commercial Activity 
Article 19(c) of the UN Convention provides another exception to State immunity in respect 
of post-judgement measures of constraint. The article states that enforcement measures are 
available if: 
 
‘It has been established that the property is specifically in use or intended for use by 
the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is in the territory of 
the State of the forum, provided that post-judgement measures of constraint may only 
be taken against property that has a connection with the entity against which the pro-
ceeding was directed.’ 
 
The 1978 UK SIA provides for an almost identical exception in section 13(4), stating that 
there is an exception from immunity from enforcement measures against property which ‘is 
for the time being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes’.  
 
A well-known European enforcement immunity case, Phillipine Embassy Bank Account Case, 
applies the same ‘purpose test’ in examining whether a State’s property is immune from an 
enforcement measure: 
 
‘There is a general rule of international law that execution by the State having jurisdic-
tion on the basis of a judicial writ of execution against a foreign State, issued in rela-
tion to non-sovereign action (acta iure gestionis) of that State’s things located or occu-
pied within the national territory of the State having jurisdiction, is inadmissible with-
out assent by the foreign State, insofar as those things serve sovereign purposes of the 
foreign State at the time of commencement of the enforcement measure.’101 
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These are some examples of the consensus that exceptions to immunity from execution and 
enforcement measures against the property of a foreign State are accepted, when the property 
is in use or intended to be used for commercial purposes.  
 
The exact determination of whether or not the requirement of a commercial purpose is ful-
filled forms the core issue of the majority of enforcement immunity decisions. To clarify the 
content of the current exception, Article 21 of the UN Convention lists certain categories of 
state property that are not to be considered as property specifically in use or intended for use 
by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes under Article 19, subpara-
graph (c): 
 
a) property, including any bank account, which is used or intended for use in the perfor-
mance of the diplomatic mission (…);102 
b) property of a military character or used or intended for use in the performance of mili-
tary functions; 
c) property of the central bank or other monetary authority of the State; 
d) property forming part of the cultural heritage of the State or part of its archives and not 
placed or intended to be placed on sale; 
e) property forming part of an exhibition of object of scientific, cultural or historical in-
terest and not placed or intended to be placed on sale. 
 
In the previously mentioned study by Reinisch, the author tries to identify types of property 
generally considered to serve sovereign or non-commercial purposes in European case-law. In 
his study, he finds that European case law generally follows the categories of property laid 
down in the UN Convention and other immunity instruments.
103
 A list similar to the one in the 
UN Convention can for example be found in the UK SIA. Section 17 defines ‘commercial 
purpose’ as ‘purposes of such transactions or activities as are mentioned in section 3(3)’, that 
is, use in relation to a sale of goods or a supply of services, a transaction for provision of fi-
nance, or a commercial, industrial, professional, or industrial activity. 
 
It is a common perception that the purpose-of-the-act-test has proved to include quite a broad 
spectrum of the economic activities of the State. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
stated that: 
 
‘…the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign cannot be drawn according to 
the purpose of the state transaction and whether it stands in a recognizable relation to 
the sovereign duties of the State. For, ultimately, activities of the State, if not wholly, 
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then to the widest degree, serve purposes and duties and stand in a still recognizable 
relationship to them.’104 
 
If interpreted in accordance with the opinion of this German court, almost all acts of a State 
can be said to be acts for public purposes. The interpretations of the purpose-test may vary 
between jurisdictions, but it is generally agreed that the governmental purpose-test provides 
greater immunity for the State and its property, than the nature-test applied in relation to ju-
risdictional immunity.
105
  The use of the word ‘purposes’ in the UN Convention and in other 
legislations may indicate a more cautious stand compared to the requirements for exception 
from immunity from jurisdiction, which refers to ‘the nature’ of the act.106 
 
The US FSIA also contains provisions granting exceptions to immunity from execution (post-
judgment) for property used for commercial activity. Section 1610(a)(2) of the FSIA provides 
that ‘the property in the US of a foreign state … used for a commercial activity in the US, 
shall not be immune from attachment… or from execution if 2) the property is or was used for 
the commercial activity upon which the claim is based’. The FSIA section 1603(d) further 
states that the ‘commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the 
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose’. The exception in the UN Convention refers to the purpose of the activity of the 
State, while the US legislation refers to the nature of the State activity. Thus it seems the USA 
have gone further in restricting the rules on sovereign immunity from execution. The US leg-
islation and case law applies the same test of nature to both exemptions to immunity from 
jurisdiction and exceptions to immunity of execution.  On the other hand, the UN Convention 
and several European countries rely on the less intrusive exemption from immunity from exe-
cution, applying the purpose-test.  
 
2.4.4.3 Nexus requirement 
In many jurisdictions there is an additional requirement in order to allow an exception to im-
munity from execution for property serving non-governmental purposes. To varying degrees, 
national legislation and international legislation and instruments demand some connection 
between the property against which enforcement measures are sought and the underlying 
claim.
107
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The UN Convention does not require a direct link between the property and the underlying 
claim. It does however require that the property one seeks to attach have an additional con-
nection over its commercial purpose: Article 19(c) requires the property to have a ‘connection 
with the entity against which the proceeding was directed’. Article 25 of the UN Convention 
states that the expression ‘entity’ in Article 19(c) means the State as an independent legal per-
sonality, a constituent unit of a federal State, a subdivision of a State, an agency or instrumen-
tality of a State or other entity, which enjoys independent legal personality. In other words, 
the ‘nexus requirement’ in Article 19(c) must be read as bringing within its exception all 
property owned or possessed by the entity. Read in conjunction, Articles 19 and 25 provide an 
exception to immunity from attachment for property of a State agency engaged solely in 
commercial activities, in respect of judgments rendered against it.
108
  
 
Section 1610(a)(2) of the US FSIA permits execution measures if ‘the property is or was used 
for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based’ and thus clearly requires a connec-
tion between the property and the underlying claim.
109
 The US FSIA nexus requirement can 
be said to serve two purposes. First, it ensures that execution of State property only takes 
place in respect of commercial activity which, pursuant to section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA falls 
within an exemption to immunity and for which consequently the US courts have jurisdiction. 
Secondly, it ‘limits the property to satisfy the judgment to resources of the State already 
committed to the non-immune transaction’.110 This nexus requirement is only relevant where 
the execution is sought against the property of the State itself. In respect of execution sought 
against a State agency or instrumentality, attachment of all property used for commercial ac-
tivity is permitted.
111
 What distinguishes the US nexus requirement from the requirement in 
the UN Convention is that the latter provides for attachment of all the property of the State 
entity and not merely the property used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based. At the same time, the UN Convention refers to the attachment of the property of the 
State entity which is a party to the proceedings and consequently against whom a judgment 
has been obtained. On this point, the UN Convention is more similar to the US FSIA under 
which execution is sought against a State agency or instrumentality. 
 
The UK SIA is quite a liberal legislation and section 13(4) only requires that the property 
against which enforcement is being sought ‘is for the time being in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes’. 
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2.4.5 Preliminary Conclusions  
As can be seen from the forgoing sections, the major jurisdictions have quite similar legisla-
tion when it comes to immunity from jurisdiction. Nevertheless, certain differences arise 
when it comes to immunity from enforcement measures. The differences include both the 
definition of what constitutes a commercial activity (purpose vs. nature-test) and whether or 
not there is an additional nexus requirement.
112
 One thing all the different jurisdictions share 
is an increasingly liberal approach to sovereign immunity. Furthermore, and regardless of 
similarities and differences, all rules on sovereign immunity can in principle have a profound 
effect on insolvent states because there is no bankruptcy protection for sovereigns: there is no 
formal legal framework enabling the sovereign lender to freeze proceedings, and nor is there a 
framework offering the opportunity to discharge or write down the debt so as to start afresh 
with the majority creditor votes which bind dissenting creditors. ‘State immunity is therefore 
to some extent a corrective protection to the exposure of states to their creditors’.113 Today the 
question of sovereign immunity, both with respect to jurisdiction and execution, is often regu-
lated in the sovereign debt contract, through an express waiver of sovereign immunity.
114
 
Such waivers are usually recognized as ‘effective in the courts of the main countries under 
whose laws these agreements are documented, such as England and New York’115 and in the 
UN Convention on Sovereign Immunities, as demonstrated previously in this chapter. Despite 
the fact that such waivers are common, the execution of a sovereign debt judgment is still 
quite challenging in practice, due to the lack of attachable property. If the sovereign debtor 
truly wishes to evade payment obligations it can simply move its property around the world, 
from one place to another, all the while avoiding actual attachment. For sovereign debtors 
who worry about their economic reputation, this may be a risky behaviour. For the average 
sovereign debtor, even the threat of litigation from a holdout creditor is a cause for serious 
concern in terms of future access to credit and the inflow of foreign investments, and may 
therefore easily result in acceptance of the holdout creditor’s claim. Some legislators have 
found that the current legal system for sovereign lending and borrowing has been unsatisfac-
tory, when it comes to handling sovereign debt restructurings. As previously mentioned, Bel-
gium, the UK and the euro zone countries have all come up with legislative initiatives which 
aim to limit the possibility for creditors to hold out from sovereign debt restructurings and 
then litigate to obtain full payment under the original non-restructured loan agreement. These 
initiatives will be examined in the forthcoming chapter. 
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3 Legislative Action 
In this chapter I will give an account of three legislative initiatives in Belgium, the UK and in 
the euro zone countries. All initiatives have arisen as a result of a political desire to ensure 
that creditors participate in sovereign debt restructurings and to limit the negative effects of 
minority creditors holding out from restructuring processes. In presenting each legislative 
initiative, I will first consider the background to the legislation, before introducing the rele-
vant provisions, and examining to what extent the legislation has been effective in reaching its 
goals. 
 
3.1 Belgium – Immunity for Developing Aid, etc. 
3.1.1 The backdrop 
In 2007, an investment fund tried to execute a foreign award against the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) in Belgian Courts. The investment fund, Kensington International, bought 
DRC debt on the second hand market for US$1.8 million. Between 2002 and 2003, Kensing-
ton International obtained four judgments against the DRC for ‘sums due under various loan 
and credit agreements’.116 As of 12 August 2005, the sums due, representing both principal 
and interest, amounted to US$121.4 million. After having obtained the judgment, the invest-
ment fund tried to seize DRC funds worldwide, including 10.3 million euros of governmental 
funds in Belgium. These funds were part of a Belgian development aid package channelled 
through the Ministry of Finance and Development Cooperation and destined for the govern-
ment of the DRC for the construction of a thermal power station.
117
  
 
In April 2008, as a consequence of this case, the Belgian Senate unanimously approved both a 
resolution and a statute ‘to safeguard the Developments Cooperation and Debt Relief from the 
actions taken by Vulture Funds’.118 By doing so, it was the first country to take a direct legal 
stand against aggressive litigious creditors.
119
 The senators who discussed the legislation were 
also alarmed by the fact that Kensington International had registered more than 10 claims 
against the DRC. The DRC is a large recipient of Belgian official development aid and they 
feared that aggressive litigation by creditors would claim more Belgian Development money 
destined for the DRC.
120
 The resolution itself justified the need for action by stating that: 
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‘In principle, what bothers the authors of this proposal is the fact that, when Western 
governments finally come to an agreement concerning debt relief, some unscrupulous 
private creditors circumvent international agreements relating to debt forgiveness.’121 
 
The senators were thus concerned about the possibility that holdout creditors ‘circumvent 
multilateral efforts geared towards reduction or cancellation of debts of very poor coun-
tries’.122 This latter argument is related to the effectiveness of the implementation of large 
international debt relief initiatives, which will be further discussed in relation to the UK legis-
lation in chapter 3.2. 
 
3.1.2 The Legislation 
Article 2 of the Act (6 April 2008) introduces a new provision in the Act of 25 May 1999, 
which organizes the legal framework for Belgian development aid cooperation.
123
 The new 
provision reads as follows: ‘the funds and assets which are earmarked for international coop-
eration as well as the funds and assets earmarked for public development aid, other than those 
relating to international cooperation, cannot be attached or assigned’.124 Article 3 of the Act 
makes an amendment to a Royal Decree reorganising the National Credit Agency and author-
ising the Minister of Finance and the Minister responsible for External trade relations, to 
make loans to states or foreign organizations. The amendment covers loans granted by Bel-
gium to foreign countries and institutions and provides that such loans are un-attachable and 
unassignable.
 125
 
 
3.1.3 Assessment 
The Belgian statute regulates the enforcement of money judgments by limiting the availability 
of seizable property (making it immune). More precisely it excludes certain property from 
attachment, namely Belgian governmental funds allotted for international development pur-
poses and loans granted by Belgium to foreign countries and foreign institutions. The main 
findings assessing the Belgian statute are that 1) the statue may contribute to preventing Bel-
gium (as a creditor) from holding out from restructuring processes; 2) it may prove to affect 
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only property situated within Belgian jurisdiction; and 3) it has limited effect on creditors’ 
overall incentives to participate in restructurings. These findings will be substantiated in the 
paragraphs that follow. 
 
Regarding the first finding, I claim that the Belgian statute may prevent the Belgian state from 
free riding on sovereign debt restructurings in the future. This argument is related to the ques-
tion of tax payers’ backlash, which was introduced in section 1.4.2. Both official development 
aid and losses born by state creditors participating in sovereign debt restructurings are ulti-
mately paid for by the tax payers of a country.  If governmental funds earmarked for develop-
ing countries end up in the pockets of a small group of creditors, the legitimacy of granting 
(taxpayers’) money to developing countries is likely to be undermined. In other words, gov-
ernment policy, which consists of contributing to sovereign debt restructurings and debt relief 
initiatives for highly indebted poor countries, may lose support if the money does not reach 
those it is intended for. When Belgian politicians act against the misuse of official develop-
ment aid and free riding on restructuring processes, this helps legitimize the Belgian govern-
ment’s use of (taxpayers’) money in restructuring processes, including debt relief initiatives. 
There are good reasons to argue that it is essential that international finance institutions and 
governmental creditors, such as Belgium, contribute to debt restructurings in order to achieve 
optimal restructuring results. I have previously argued that the participation of all creditors is 
important to achieve optimal restructuring and to avoid free riding becoming a tempting op-
tion for even more creditors. While the private sector remains the biggest sovereign creditor, 
significant amounts of sovereign debt are owed to official creditors (both governments and 
international finance institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank). The figure below 
shows the stock of external debt by borrower type (and maturity).
126
   
 
Figure 2: Stock of External Debt by Borrower Type and Maturity, 2000-2011 
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Regarding the second point mentioned above, it is worth noting that the wording of the Bel-
gian statute is clear and will effectively prevent lawsuits seeking to seize the specific property 
regulated, and this will be so as long as the property is situated within Belgian jurisdiction. In 
respect of developing funds, these are often headed out of the Belgian jurisdiction and it is 
possible that the funds may again become attachable when they arrive at their destination. It 
may also be questioned whether a court located outside Belgium will give any effect to the 
special status of assets earmarked for Development Cooperation and development aid under 
the Belgian statute, if a creditor seeks to seize the funds as they pass through another jurisdic-
tion. The answer will no doubt vary from one jurisdiction to another, depending on the respec-
tive laws, and I will therefore leave the question open. 
 
With respect to the third finding, it must be said that the design of the Belgian statute is quite 
general and is meant to cover all attachment claims over certain types of property, regardless 
of the basis for the sovereign debt claim. At the same time, the Belgian statute only protects 
state development funds and loans from attachment, and leaves all other property open to at-
tachment in fulfilment of a sovereign debt holdout claim (except for property that is otherwise 
protected, see chapter2.4). Further, the statute does not prevent minority creditors from hold-
ing out from restructuring processes, nor does it prevent holdout creditors from suing and ob-
taining a judgment on the merits confirming the creditor’s right to the full amount under the 
original (non-restructured) loan agreement. During the legislative process, politicians argued 
that holdout creditors free riding on debt relief initiatives had to be stopped. The Belgian leg-
islation protects property that is probably viewed by politicians and the population at large as 
amongst the most cynical assets to seize, but in fact protects only a small selection of property 
from attachment. More specifically, it prevents new funds for developing countries from be-
ing attached in fulfilment of a sovereign debt claim. In principle, it is still possible to free ride 
on the actual losses taken on by governmental and private creditors by attaching other kinds 
of property and by suing for the full amount under the original loan agreement in Belgian 
courts. Despite references to, and criticism of, holdout litigation and so called vulture fund 
activity in the law-making process, the statute itself does not address the broader challenge of 
creditors holding out from restructuring processes and ensuing litigation claims.
127
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3.2 The United Kingdom – Law Aimed at Preserving HIPC Debt Relief 
3.2.1 The Backdrop 
The UK government’s commitment to granting debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries 
was reinforced after it chaired the G8 meeting in 2005.
128
 The meeting culminated in the Mul-
tilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which involved the International Development Asso-
ciation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Fund cancelling 
US$50 billion in debt to the world poorest countries that had completed (or would complete) 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
129
  
 
As a result of the international debt relief provided by the HIPC initiative and the MDRI, 
some creditors started taking advantage of the fact that certain debtor countries were now in a 
better economic position to pay off other debt obligations. These creditors commenced law-
suits against different HIPC countries claiming full repayment under the original loan agree-
ments, as they stood prior to the HIPC debt relief. One such lawsuit took place in England in 
2007, when a private investment fund called Donegal International sued Zambia, a low in-
come country ranked 142
th
 in the Human Development Index (in 2014).
130
 The lawsuit was 
based on a US$15.5 million debt contract dating back to 1979, concluded between Romania 
and Zambia, in connection with the purchase of agricultural equipment. In 1999, Donegal 
bought debt owed to Romania for the amount of US$3.3 million. After first having reached an 
agreement with Zambia, the country defaulted again and Donegal commenced legal proceed-
ings claiming full repayment of the debt plus interest totalling US$55 million. In the final 
award, the High Court (UK) found this amount to be punitive and awarded US$15.5 million, 
almost five times the amount the company had originally paid for the debt.
131
 A more recent 
case brought before UK courts by the Caribbean-based investment funds Hamas Investments 
and Wall Capital concerned holdout litigation against Liberia. Liberia had borrowed US$6 
million from US-based Chemical Bank in 1978. The investment funds pursued the debt 
through litigation and, in 2009 the High Court awarded the investment funds US$20 million, 
an amount said to be equivalent to around 5 per cent of the country’s national budget. In the 
same year, Liberia had benefited from a US$1.2 billion debt buy-back through the World 
Bank at a 97 per cent discount on its face value. The two litigating investment funds were the 
only two private creditors who had refused to participate in the buy-back arrangement.
132
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These lawsuits against sovereign debtors in UK courts raised awareness of the problem of 
aggressive holdout creditors and the business model of so-called vulture funds. British citi-
zens, NGOs and politicians did not approve of the situation where holdout creditors made a 
profit out of the good will of other creditors who had taken a share of the losses the HIPC and 
MDRI debt relief initiatives actually entailed.
133
  
 
3.2.2 The legislation  
3.2.2.1 Introduction 
As a reaction to the creditor lawsuits mentioned above, the United Kingdom Parliament 
passed the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act in April 2010. The legislation was de-
signed to ensure that all creditors provide their share of debt relief under the Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
134
 The Government press release stated that the Act aimed 
to tackle ‘the problem of a small minority of creditors, often referred to as “Vulture Funds”, 
taking HIPCs [Heavily Indebted Poor Countries] to court to try to get back the full value of 
their debts, including interest and penalties for arrears’.135 The Act had a sunset clause primar-
ily introduced to review evidence of the impact of the legislation, but on 16 May 2011 the Act 
became permanent.  
 
3.2.2.2 The Act  
The specific debts regulated in the Act are called ‘qualifying debts’ and are defined in detail 
in sections 1(3) and 2. Qualifying debt encompasses public or publicly guaranteed debt that is 
external, and which the HIPC Initiative applies (or potentially applies) to. Qualifying debts 
must be incurred before the commencement of the Act and, if the HIPC initiative already ap-
plies to a country, the debt must have been incurred before the decision point of the HIPC 
process was reached.
136
  
 
According to section 3(1), read in conjunction with section 4 of the Act, the amount recovera-
ble in respect of a qualifying debt, or in any cause of action relating to a qualifying debt, is the 
amount that would otherwise be recoverable if the debt were reduced in accordance with the 
HIPC Initiative. Sections 3(4) and 3(6) specify that the amount recoverable under a ‘compro-
mise agreement’ or ‘rescheduled debt or a new debt’ agreement is also limited to the amount 
that would otherwise be recoverable if the debt were reduced in accordance with the HIPC 
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Initiative. According to section 3(8), the maximum cap on the amount recoverable also ap-
plies to the enforcement of any security. Section 3(9) notes that the cap on the amount recov-
erable outlined in section 3 also applies if the law applicable ‘to the qualifying debt, or to any 
compromise agreement, refinancing agreement or security, is the law of a country outside the 
United Kingdom’. 
 
According to section 5(1), the Act applies both to judgments concerning HIPC debt handed 
down by a court in the UK before commencement of the act; foreign judgments handed down 
(whether before or after commencement) on a relevant claim; and awards made (whether be-
fore or after commencement) on a relevant claim in arbitration (conducted under any law). 
This means that the recoverable amount in cases where enforcement of foreign judgments and 
awards is sought within the UK is also subject to the maximum cap on recoverable funds, laid 
down in section 3 of the Act. To sum up, the Act regulates the total amount recoverable from 
a claim based on a contract conferred to the jurisdiction of UK courts (even if the law appli-
cable is the law of a country outside the United Kingdom); the total amount recoverable under 
a claim based on a contract subject to UK law anywhere in the world; and the execution of a 
foreign judgment or award concerning HIPC debt within the UK. 
 
3.2.3 The Assessment 
The UK, and especially England, is a global financial centre and many sovereign credit con-
tracts are subject to English law and confer jurisdiction to the English courts. With respect to 
sovereign bonds, approximately 48 per cent are subject to English law.
137
 In addition, many 
foreign states have assets in or passing through the UK, so that they may be exposed to at-
tachment in connection with the execution of a sovereign debt judgment in the UK. Changes 
in legislation that affect creditors’ incentives to participate in the restructuring of sovereign 
debt and to litigate sovereign debt claims, may therefore have a major impact on the system of 
sovereign lending and borrowing.  
 
The UK Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act encompasses court claims concerning origi-
nal loan contracts, compromise agreements and restructured HIPC debts, which means that all 
these agreements are subject to the same maximum cap on recoverable funds. To ensure that 
the maximum cap is respected, the Act indirectly regulates (or moderates) the rights laid down 
in these lending agreements both where a claim is brought before a court within the United 
Kingdom (regardless of whether the law applicable to the contract is the law of a country out-
side UK law or not) and where enforcement of a sovereign debt judgment or award is sought 
within the UK jurisdiction. The UK Act only has direct effect inside UK jurisdiction. Howev-
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er, the Act also affects the execution of a UK judgment in foreign jurisdictions. Taken togeth-
er these features constitute quite a comprehensive approach, which makes it difficult for hold-
out creditors to circumvent the aim of the legislation.  
 
The UK Act does not force creditors to participate in sovereign debt restructurings or debt 
relief directly, nor does it prevent one from bringing a sovereign debt claim. By putting a cap 
on the maximum amount recoverable for certain types of sovereign debt, the Act discourages 
holdout creditors from suing for the whole amount. Whether or not a creditor takes part in 
restructuring or debt relief, such as HIPC debt relief, a creditor will not be able to extract 
more money through a lawsuit than he would have been entitled to receive had he participated 
in HIPC debt relief. Thus, the Act makes it somewhat meaningless for creditors to commence 
proceedings in the courts of the UK, with respect to the defined types of debt. As a result, and 
in respect of HIPC debt, the Act will provide an incentive to participate in restructuring initia-
tives and grant debt relief, rather than to hold out from such proceedings and litigate for the 
full amount. It should also be mentioned that both the description of qualifying debt and the 
instructions on how to calculate the cap on recoverable funds is made clear and simple. This 
will probably keep the number of court cases down, because it seems unnecessary to further 
clarify the content of the legislation. Confirming this assumption is the fact that, to my 
knowledge, there have been no lawsuits in UK courts claiming full repayment of HIPC debts, 
since the Act came into effect. 
 
The expressed aim of the Act was to ensure that the money freed up by debt relief in HIPC 
countries would not have to be spent on debt repayment to holdout creditors, but would in-
stead be used for actual poverty reduction. Based on my assessment above, I will argue that 
the UK Act has been successful in reaching this goal. It does ensure that UK courts neither 
hand down, nor enforce, judgments allowing recovery against HIPCs on qualifying debts, 
exceeding the amount calculated as sustainable under the HIPC Initiative. However, if we 
look back at the argument used in the run up to the passing of the Bill and when announcing 
the Act, both parliamentarians and the UK government spoke in quite broad terms about the 
fight against the more general problem of holdout creditors and free riding. The UK Act is 
strictly limited to HIPC debts, other (restructured) debt burdens having been left out com-
pletely. There is, therefore, still a considerable risk of holdout creditors using UK jurisdiction 
to litigate for full repayment under the original terms of a non-restructured loan agreement. It 
is important to bear in mind that the HIPC initiative is a one-time solution which is now being 
phased out. Total estimated debt relief through HIPC and MDRI amounts to US$112.5 bil-
lion.
138
 In the meantime, new sovereign debt burdens are being taken on, and the total amount 
                                                 
138
  World Bank (2012).  
37 
 
of external debt in developing countries as of end 2013 was US$5,506.4 billion. In Sub-
Saharan Africa alone, the total amount was US$367.5 billion.
139
 Not all of these debt burdens 
are unsustainable; this figure does however suggest that there are debt burdens that may re-
quire restructuring in the future. For all these debt burdens, the UK Act provides no incentives 
to ensure that all creditors participate in debt restructurings or debt relief, when the majority 
of the creditors are willing to do so. This means that economic contributions granted in rela-
tion to debt relief (other than through the HIPC initiative) or sovereign debt restructurings in 
which the UK has participated, may still be ‘exposed’ to claims from holdout creditors. For all 
these other debt burdens, a holdout creditor may put pressure on the sovereign debtor to pay 
in accordance with the original loan agreement and/or engage actual court proceedings to ob-
tain full payment. As explained earlier in chapter 3.1.3, no one likes to bear the cost of free 
riders. If holdout creditors subsequent to restructuring manage to collect on the original claim 
for all restructured debt burdens except from HIPC debt, the consequence may still be a de-
crease in the participation in debt restructuring and debt relief both from public sector credi-
tors and from private creditors in general.  
 
To sum up, the UK Act has succeeded in curbing aggressive litigation on HIPC debts in UK 
courts. However, the argument put forward by politicians promoting the Act  - namely that it 
would put an end to creditor free riding – have not been fulfilled, since all debts except HIPC 
debts remains unregulated and thus open to litigation and execution. 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, it is important to mention that sovereign bonds subject 
to English law often include so-called Collective Action Clauses (CACs). The CACs are not 
mandatory, but have been standard in sovereign bonds subject to English law for a long 
time.
140
 CACs enables a majority (or a supermajority) of the bondholders to bind the minority 
to certain changes in the contract terms; typically to accept a restructuring or not. This does 
improve the incentives in the case of judgments on claims in general, but not the possibility of 
executing a judgment within the jurisdiction of the UK. A further examination of CACs will 
be provided in section 3.3 and 4.3.3.  
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3.3 Euro Area - Mandatory Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in Sovereign 
Bonds 
3.3.1 The Backdrop 
Several European countries have experienced distressed economies with unsustainable debt 
levels over the past decade. The first and most grave incident in the euro crisis took place in 
Greece sometime after the crisis hit Wall Street in 2008. It was then revealed that the country 
had unsustainably high public expenditure, a poor system of tax revenues, a private sector 
vulnerable to economic cycles, and that the Greek economy (and especially the Greek gov-
ernment), had been financing its deficit through external borrowing.
141
 Shortly after the Greek 
crisis occurred, another crisis followed in Ireland, but the causes of the crisis were quite dif-
ferent. Irish banks had been financing a real estate bubble, and the bubble burst when Irish 
banks were unable to refinance their maturing international loans through the international 
financial markets. The Irish government bailed out almost the entire financial sector which 
put them in a situation of sovereign insolvency.
142
 Other countries, Spain and Italy in particu-
lar, followed suit, though again the crisis encountered had different origins. Spain ran a high 
deficit on its public administration due, among other reasons, to a troubled private sector and 
an insolvent financial system. Italy, on the other hand, had a sounder private sector but signif-
icant public debt.
143
 By 2010, the financial stability of the European Union was severely 
threatened by escalating public debt burdens, and other countries’ economies were in danger 
of being contaminated.    
 
Within this context, the European Union felt the need to act, and on 28 November 2010, Eu-
rozone Finance Ministers announced a number of policy measures intended to safeguard fi-
nancial stability in the euro area. One such measure was the mandatory inclusion of standard-
ised collective action clauses (CACs) in all new euro area government securities.
144
 The use 
of CACs is a contractual technique designed to ease the coordination problems that may com-
plicate the restructuring of sovereign bond debt and thwart the disruptive practices of holdout 
creditors. Implementation of mandatory CACs in the euro area was not directly provoked by 
restructuring problems. However, as just explained, during the financial crisis several Europe-
an countries faced (and still face) serious debt distress and were in danger of having to re-
structure their debts. In such situations CACs can serve to rein in holdout creditors, who may 
constitute a significant obstacle to the success of the restructuring process. Another equally 
important objective behind the treaty was to ensure that EU countries would not have to bail 
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out other EU countries. Instead, the idea was to create incentives for creditors to take part in 
restructuring.
145
  
 
The contractual nature of CACs implies that they are covered by private autonomy and that 
the terms are negotiable. However, with respect to sovereign bonds the terms are naturally set 
by the issuer. To ensure that euro zone countries implemented equivalent CACs in their sov-
ereign securities, a binding international treaty between euro zone countries was drawn up. A 
standardised CAC,
146
 including supplemental provisions,
147
 was first developed and agreed by 
the Economic and Financial Committee on 18 November 2011. The commitment to include 
such CACs was thereafter included in the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mecha-
nism (EMS) signed on 2 February 2012 between the euro area Member States.
148
 According 
to the ‘Report on the implementation of euro area Model Collective Action Clause (CAC)’, as 
of 1 January 2013, all euro member states have taken the necessary steps to include the model 
CAC in new issuances with a maturity of more than one year, as agreed in Article 12(3) of the 
ESM Treaty. The CAC has been implemented either by contractual incorporation through 
amended legislation or regulation.
 149
  
 
3.3.2 The legislation - the euro area Model CAC 
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
According to Article 12(3) of the ESM Treaty, the euro area Model CAC applies to all new 
euro area government securities, with a maturity above one year. The article further states that 
the CACs must be implemented ‘in a way which ensures that their legal impact is identical’. 
In the following I will set out the main features of the Common Terms of Reference of the 
euro area Model CAC.  
 
3.3.2.2 Majority restructuring provisions - modification of bonds in a single series  
Section 2 of the euro area Model CAC sets out the terms and conditions for the modification 
of bonds. These modification provisions are majority provisions, which allow a defined per-
centage of bondholders to approve certain decisions by vote that will bind all holders of cer-
tain bonds. According to section 1(f) of the Model CAC, the word ‘modification’ refers to 
‘any modification, amendment, supplement or waiver of the terms and conditions of the 
Bonds or any agreement governing the issuance or administration of the Bond…’. According 
to the same section, the Model CAC differentiates between ordinary modifications and more 
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profound modifications related to payment terms, such as the change of seniority or ranking 
of the bonds; the governing law; the principal amount; the date on which any amount is paya-
ble; the currency and place of payment; the issuer’s obligation to make payments; and the 
release of any guarantee issued in relation to the bonds. These more profound modifications 
are referred to as ‘reserved matters’. The list of modifications that must be considered as ‘re-
served matters’, is constructed in a way that indicates that all modifications that do not form 
part of the list should be considered as a non-reserved matter. 
 
The Model CAC includes two possible procedural paths to modify a sovereign bond: through 
the summoning of a bondholder meeting or by means of a written resolution, c.f. section 2.1 
(a) and (b) respectively. Both procedures set out specific requirements for a qualified majority 
and for a quorum (the percentage of bondholders required to take a vote). In order to modify a 
reserved matter in relation to a single series of bonds, the consent of the Issuer is required and 
an affirmative vote of holder of not less than 75 per cent of the aggregated principal amount 
of the outstanding bonds ‘represented at a duly called meeting of Bondholders’.150 Alterna-
tively, a written resolution must be signed by or on behalf of holders of not less than 66 2/3 
per cent of the aggregated principal amount of the Bonds then outstanding.
151
 In addition, 
according to section 4.5(a), quorum requires that no less than 66 2/3 per cent of the outstand-
ing principal amount of the affected bonds be present in order to transact any meeting at 
which Bondholders will vote on such a modification. The majority requirements in the euro 
area Model CAC for single-series modification of a reserved matter have been set at a level 
that ensures that any voting scenario needs the approval of at least a majority in principal 
amount of the affected bonds (>75% x 66 2/3 % > 50%).
152
 According to sections 2.5 and 
4.5(b) of the Model CAC, non-reserved matters require the approval of more than 50 per cent 
of the outstanding amount in a meeting where 50 per cent of the outstanding principal amount 
is present. In the case of a written procedure, the approval rate for non-reserved matters is also 
set at 50 per cent.
153
 
 
3.3.2.3 Aggregation clauses - modification of bonds across several series 
The procedure described above is limited to the modification of one series of bonds. Section 
1(d) of the Model CAC defines a ‘series’ as different tranches of debt securities that in rela-
tion to each other and to the original tranche of debt securities are ‘i) identical in all respects 
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except for their date of issuance or first payment date, and ii) expressed to be consolidated and 
form a single series, and includes the Bonds and any further issuances of bond’. According to 
section 2.2, the Model CAC does also allow for cross-series modification. This means that modi-
fication voting is aggregated so that the bondholders of more than one bond series can decide 
whether to amend the bond terms collectively. According to section 2.2(a)(i), the modification 
of reserved matters requires the consent of the Issuer and the affirmative vote of no less than 
75 per cent of the ‘aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities represented 
at separate duly called meeting of the holders of the debt securities of all the series (taken in 
the aggregate) that would be affected by the proposed modification’. Alternatively, a modifi-
cation may be made by written resolution signed by the holders of not less than 66 2/3 per 
cent of the aggregate principal amount of all the series that would be affected by the proposed 
modification, cf. section 2.2 (a)(ii). According to section 2.2(b)(i) and (ii) respectively, such a 
modification also requires an affirmative vote of more than 66 2/3 per cent of the aggregate 
principal amount of the outstanding debt securities represented at separate duly called meet-
ings of the holders of each series of the debt securities that would be affected by the proposed 
modification; or a written resolution signed by the holders of more than 50 per cent of the 
aggregate principal amount of the then outstanding debt securities of each series that would 
be affected by the proposed modification. According to section 4.5 of the Model CAC, the 
quorum requirement for a cross-series modification at a meeting is still 66 2/3 per cent of the 
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding bonds. In the case of a cross-series modifica-
tion of a non-reserved matter, the quorum is 50 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of 
the outstanding bonds. 
 
The Model CAC leaves it to the sovereign to decide whether to exercise the aggregation op-
tion that lies in the cross-series modification provision, and how many series to include in it. 
The Model CAC also allows for partial cross-series modification in section 2.4: If a proposed 
cross-series modification of a reserved matter is not approved across all series, but would 
have been approved in one series, or in only some of the series of affected debt securities, this 
partial cross-series modification will be approved. The issuer is required to notify the inves-
tors in advance of the conditions under which a partial cross-series modification will be effec-
tive.  
 
3.3.2.4 Disenfranchisement provision 
Section 2.7(c) of the euro area Model CAC contains disenfranchisement provisions that de-
termine which bondholders are not entitled to vote in the modification proceedings described 
in the said Model CAC. According to section 2.7(c)(i) – (iii), bonds will not be taken into 
account for the calculation of quorums and majority voting if the bond is held by the issuer; 
by a department, ministry or agency of the Issuer; or by a corporation, a trust or other legal 
entity that is controlled by the issuer (or its subordinate agencies), in a situation where the 
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holder is in different ways controlled by, or under the instruction of, the Issuer or one of the 
underlying entities of the Issuer.  
 
3.3.2.5 Facilitated Communication - Rules on Representatives and Bondholder 
Meetings 
Section 3 of the Model CAC provides for a ‘calculation agent’ whose responsibility is to cal-
culate whether a proposed modification has been approved in accordance with the require-
ments put forward in the Model CAC. This includes the calculation of the outstanding bonds 
not disenfranchised, and whether the required quorum and supermajority is reached. It is the 
issuer who, according to section 3.1, provides the information regarding outstanding amounts 
and disenfranchised bondholders.  
 
The Model CAC includes mandatory rules for the organization of bondholders meetings.  
Section 4 of the Model CAC regulates the possibility for bondholders to call a bondholders 
meeting. Section 4.2 requires that bondholders shall meet at any time, at the request of the 
issuer or of bondholders holding at least 10 per cent of the outstanding principal.  
 
3.3.2.6 Majority enforcement provisions (acceleration, litigation, moratorium) 
The euro area Model CAC includes supplementary provisions that only come into effect if the 
relevant sovereign bond actually provides for certain features. Section 2 of the supplementary 
provision provides for so-called acceleration clauses. When a sovereign defaults on a single 
bond, this may trigger a default on the entire debt, even though the rest of the debt would 
normally mature in the future. This effect is called acceleration and is produced by a contract 
provision commonly found in international sovereign bonds. The acceleration clause in sec-
tion 2.1 in the supplementary Model CAC provides that ‘holders of not less than 25 per cent 
of the aggregate principal amount of the outstanding [b]onds may . . . declare the [b]onds to 
be immediately due and payable.’ The acceleration can, according to section 2.2, be reversed 
through the support of more than 50 per cent of the aggregate principal amount of the out-
standing bonds. Section 3 of the supplemental provisions contains a further limitation on indi-
vidual holder action (a moratorium) on all bond claims, which prohibits bondholders from 
enforcing their claims under the bonds individually. This limitation only applies if the bond 
provides for bondholders to have a representative. If the bondholders in such a case have 
failed to enforce the claims collectively, the right goes back to the individual bondholder.  
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3.3.3 The Assessment 
3.3.3.1 The majority modification provisions 
The core of the euro area Model CAC is the ability, for a qualified majority of the bondhold-
ers, to bind the minority. If a qualified majority of the bondholders are able to come to an 
agreement, all bonds will be modified, thus binding any holdout creditors.
154
 This makes it 
harder for lone or small groups of creditors to impede a course of action, such as a restructur-
ing, that might benefit the group as a whole.
155
 In other words, it is a tool to overcome the 
free-riding problem that occurs when the need to compromise one’s claim diminishes because 
other bondholders compromise first.
156
 The introduction of this majority provision may also 
effectively prevent litigation by holdout creditors after a restructuring deal has been reached 
with the majority of the creditors. 
 
If a modification is based on votes in an individual series of bonds, the bondholders of other 
series may benefit from voting against a restructuring in the hope that the bondholders of oth-
er series will ‘approve the restructuring, accept losses, and thereby improve the sovereign’s 
financial situation’.157 If bondholders in several series do the same, there is a risk that there 
will be no restructuring at all. One example of the inefficiency of single series CACs was a 
restructuring in Dominica in 2004. Another example is the Greek restructuring in 2012. In the 
latter case there was a relatively high concentration of bonds in the hands of certain creditors 
who managed to block the position in about half of the foreign law-governed bond series, 
thereby preventing the operation of CACs in those series.
158
 Such blocking may, for inter-
creditor reasons, ‘undermine the incentives of other series to agree to the terms of the restruc-
turing’.159  
 
The euro area Model CAC does not only provide for single series modification but also for 
aggregated modification. If the voting is aggregated, the bondholders of more than one bond 
series may decide whether to amend the bond terms collectively. An aggregated modification 
clause will treat bondholders of all affected bond series as a group, because the voting re-
quirements will apply equally to them all. This will clearly improve the chances of binding 
holdout creditors. However, the second requirement in the provision regulating cross-series 
modification in the model CAC (section 2.2 (b)) still provides a veto right to each individual 
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series of affected bonds. This means that the creditors within each series still have to accept 
the amendment, though with a lower qualified majority vote than that requires in the case of 
single series modifications. When there is a requirement that each series approve the modifi-
cation, there is still a risk that a minority of the bondholders block a restructuring.  
 
It can be argued that the possibility of partial cross-series modification may improve the 
overall outcome of a restructuring process. If the creditors in one series have managed to cre-
ate a blocking position, this flexibility ensures that the remaining series will still be bound, 
only precluding the restructuring from going forward in the particular series where holdout 
creditors have obtained a blocking position. However, it may also be argued that the flexibil-
ity introduced by partial cross-series modification may operate as an incentive for creditors 
not to participate in a vote due to the risk that amendments may affect only some series of 
bonds.
160
 For these reasons, it is difficult to conclude whether or not the possibility of partial 
cross-series modification will in fact improve the chances of a successful restructuring in 
practice.  
 
In August 2014, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) issued a new standard 
collective action clause for the terms and conditions of sovereign notes. These new standards 
are intended to facilitate future sovereign debt restructurings.
161
 One of the main features of 
the new ICMA standard is the use of so-called ‘single-limb’ voting procedures. This proce-
dure requires a single vote calculated on an aggregated basis across all affected bond series, 
and no second vote within each series.
162
 In September of the same year, the IMF expressed 
its support for the use of such a ‘single limb’ voting procedure in CACs.163 Both the IMF and 
ICMA recognize that existing CACs, where voting procedures are limited to single series or 
limited (‘two-limb’) aggregation clauses, are not sufficient to cope with the problem of hold-
out creditors in restructuring processes.
164
 The IMF has also stated that if a two-limb voting 
procedure, such as the aggregation clause in the euro area Model CAC, had been used in 
Greece’s case, ‘it is doubtful whether the large bond series that were falling due shortly after 
the exchange would have voted to participate in the exchange’.165 Both organizations suggest 
that a single limb vote should provide that a restructuring becomes binding for all creditors on 
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obtaining the support of 75 per cent of the total outstanding principal of aggregated claims.
166
 
The fact that two leading organizations within the area of international finance have conclud-
ed that there is a need for a single-limb voting procedure, is a strong indication that the single 
series voting and limited aggregation voting offered by the euro area model clause, may not 
be sufficient when it comes to ensuring satisfactory conditions for sovereign debt restructur-
ing.  
 
In this respect, the question arises whether the euro area Model CAC is designed to set a 
‘minimum standard’, such that the euro countries may adopt the more restrictive ICMA 
standard CAC? The ICMA has stated that they want the revised standard CAC to be able to 
work alongside the euro area Model CAC.
167
 In support of this view is the fact that the main 
aim of the euro area Model CAC is to ease the restructuring process. In other words, since the 
ICMA CAC is believed to improve the likelihood of obtaining successful restructuring, it may 
be argued that it is up to the euro countries themselves to choose whether or not they want to 
implement a single-limb voting procedure in accordance with the ICMA model. At the same 
time, the euro area Model CAC states that the CACs implemented in respective countries’ 
bonds should be identical. This may suggest that the stricter ICMA CAC cannot be imple-
mented in euro countries. The legal situation does not seem to be settled. It would be unfortu-
nate if the Treaty introducing the euro area Model CAC actually hindered implementation of 
the model CAC recommended by the IMF and the ICMA in the euro area.  
 
3.3.3.2 Facilitated Communication and the role of bondholder representatives 
The euro area Model CAC provides for a calculation agent, who is responsible for calculating 
the relevant numbers in voting procedures related to modification of the terms of a bond. This 
includes both calculations concerning which bondholders are entitled to vote during restruc-
turing and the exact amount of outstanding bonds. Undisputable information is useful because 
it can increase the chances of a successful restructuring agreement by reducing conflict and 
easing voting procedures. However, the calculation agent in the model CAC has a relatively 
small role in the wider process of modification. For example, it is up to the issuer to provide 
the figures, which will serve as the basis for the calculation. Furthermore, the calculation 
agent is chosen by the issuer. This latter feature can be problematic for creditors if they doubt 
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the impartiality of the agent. Such suspicions may weaken the position of the calculation 
agent and result in a more difficult restructuring process.   
 
Overall, the model CAC encompasses few features that facilitate communication between the 
bondholders and the issuer, and amongst the bondholders themselves. There are also very few 
measures aimed at facilitating communication between the parties engaged in a debt restruc-
turing. As will be discussed in the next section, the supplementary provisions mention the 
possibility of appointing a bondholder representative with broader responsibilities than the 
calculation agent, but do not make such representation mandatory. The lack of regulations 
facilitating communication between the parties to a sovereign debt restructuring may be con-
sidered unfortunate. Through facilitated communication, solutions can be found before de-
faults occur and lawsuits may be avoided. In cases where the bondholders are numerous and 
dispersed, as is usually the case with today’s sovereign bonds, it would be more effective to 
have one representative who ‘aggregates the interests of a multitude of creditors, thereby fa-
cilitating matters for the sovereign while strengthening the bondholders’ negotiating powers 
as compared to their relative individual insignificance’.168 In their response to the consultation 
on the euro area Model Clause, the ICMA recommends that the model CAC ‘fully provide for 
a bondholder representative in respect of relevant debt securities’.169 The ICMA suggests that 
it is essential to have an entity with more responsibilities than a calculation agent, such as a 
fiscal agent or trustee or bondholder representative, if the bondholder meetings described in 
the Model CAC are to operate successfully.
170
 The ICMA questions whether there is, under 
the current euro area Model CAC, a party responsible for ‘performing all the relevant steps 
relating to the convening of meetings of bondholders including compliance with applicable 
voting procedures at meetings and compliance with the procedural steps related to the passing 
of a written resolution’.171 Furthermore, the ICMA fears that a calculation agent with limited 
responsibilities, as set out in the Model CAC, does not provide sufficient certainty or trans-
parency to prevent challenges from bondholders.   
 
To sum up, the existence of a calculation agent is a feature which may ease the restructuring 
process to a certain extent. As argued above the calculation agent in the Model CAC has very 
limited responsibility, and may prove to have a limited positive effect on the restructuring 
process.   
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3.3.3.3 The majority enforcement provisions 
The supplemental provisions of the Model CAC open up the possibility of limiting sole holder 
action by requiring that a representative of the bondholders pursue all claims (litigation and 
enforcement attempts) collectively. Limiting sole bondholder action may have a positive ef-
fect on achieving a restructuring agreement, because it prevents single bondholders from up-
holding claims that are not in the interest of the majority. Furthermore, it promotes equal 
treatment of creditors and thereby contributes to preventing free riding. Clauses regulating 
bondholder representatives are frequent in Anglo-American law-based bond issuances. How-
ever, as mentioned in the previous section, the EU Committee decided not to make this a 
mandatory part of the euro area Model CAC. It can be argued that the inclusion of this clause 
is ‘recommended’ via its inclusion in the supplemental provisions. Since the practice in re-
spect of bondholder representatives varies a lot within the civil law jurisdictions of Europe, 
the normative effect of the supplemental provisions is at least dubious.
172
 
 
The supplemental provisions of the Model CAC also include another provision concerning 
enforcement, namely an acceleration clause. This clause provides that when a sovereign de-
faults on a single bond, this may trigger a default on the entire debt (acceleration), even 
though the remaining debt would normally mature at a later date. According to the supple-
mental provisions, acceleration can only be triggered by a bondholders’ majority vote. In ad-
dition, it provides for the reversal of acceleration by majority vote with a lower threshold. 
Both by requiring a majority vote to initiate acceleration and by providing the possibility of 
reversing acceleration (rescission of acceleration), the provision is likely to have positive ef-
fects on the probability of reaching a restructuring agreement and so decrease the number of 
holdouts. In the case of a pre-default restructuring, the acceleration clause of the Model CAC 
may contribute in decreasing the chances of a mass default. The actual restructuring of a bond 
can take some time, and the sovereign debtor may default before a restructuring agreement is 
reached. If there is a requirement for a majority vote to accelerate a default on the entire debt, 
and there exists a possibility to undo the acceleration, this may help avoid a mass default; a 
snowball effect that could aggravate the financial situation of the sovereign even more. With 
the possibility of limiting the acceleration there will be less debt in actual default, which 
means fewer debt series to restructure, and fewer creditors to coordinate. As with the clause 
providing limitations on sole holder action, however, what weakens the acceleration clause is 
the fact that it is voluntary. 
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3.3.3.4 General scepticism towards CACs 
CACs may also be criticised at a more general level. This criticism usually goes beyond the ques-
tion of the effectiveness of the design of a specific CAC. The general criticism is linked to the 
fact that CACs represent a contractual and market-based approach. The argument is that this 
contractual approach does not go far enough and may constitute an obstacle to a more com-
prehensive and structural solution to the problem of minority holdout creditors. 
 
First, it can be argued that majority voting provisions do not provide for sufficiently compre-
hensive restructuring. As described in section 3.3.3.1, a restructuring will become easier if the 
specific CAC includes a cross-series modification provision that applies a single-limb voting 
procedure. However, with thousands of creditors and many bonds with variable bond terms 
(different payment terms and maturities), it may still be difficult to create an exchange offer 
that the majority of the different bond issues will accept. A situation where there are thou-
sands of small creditors (investors) is likely to create an atmosphere with fewer incentives to 
take an active choice and actually participate in a debt restructuring. In other words, the mere 
nature of investing in a modern sovereign bond may lead to a situation where it is less likely 
that creditors choose to take part in restructurings. Additionally, CACs do not provide any 
solution to the problem of minority holdout creditors for outstanding bond-debt where CACs 
have not been included. As of June 2014, the IMF has estimated that of the approximately 
US$900 billion foreign law bonds outstanding, about 20 per cent do not include CACs. Of a 
total outstanding stock of New York law governed bonds of about US$420 billion, about 25 
per cent do not include CACs.
173
 The problem of holdout creditors also continues to exist for 
outstanding non-bond debt, which does normally not include CACs. The long-term external 
debt owed by developing countries to private creditors amounts to US$1041.7 billion,  
US$818.0 billion of which is bonds and US$223.7 billion of which is non-bond debt.
174
  
  
Second, it is argued that majority voting may leave the sovereign with too much debt. The 
argument is that ‘creditors will trade off the efficiency benefits of debt reductions against the 
costs in terms of reduced expected debt repayments’.175 The consequence may be a debt re-
structuring procedure that is too creditor-friendly leading to inefficiently low debt for-
giveness, and even an increased possibility that the debtor country will default again in the 
near future.  
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Third, majority voting provisions may undermine an informal system of (absolute) priority 
that is common in the area of sovereign lending. This informal system of priority is important 
because, compared to corporate debtors, it is more difficult for sovereign debtors to offer col-
lateral. Even when a sovereign debtor intends to provide security, it is quite demanding to 
actually succeed in enforcement. Due to the lack of effective collateral within the context of 
sovereign lending, states have often relied on differential repayment schedules and implicit 
priorities. Some academics fear that if debt restructurings are left to the market, ‘there is no 
way to guarantee that the parties’ agreed-on priorities will actually be respected if the sover-
eign encounters financial distresses’.176 If creditors are afraid of losing such priority during a 
restructuring, it will be an incentive for them to hold out from such processes, increasing their 
chances of reaching a blocking position.  
 
It should be noted that there is also another general criticism of CACs voiced by representa-
tives other than those just mentioned: since CACs make it easier for a sovereign to restructure 
debt, lending costs will increase. Their argument is not focused on the effect of CACs on 
creditors’ participation in restructurings, and is hence less relevant to this thesis. It is however 
worth noting that recent research indicates that the presence of a CAC in a sovereign bond 
issue is associated with a lower cost of capital, especially for financially weak issuers. Fur-
ther, the research finds that there is a ‘significant positive relation between spreads and the 
number of votes required to change the payment terms’.177 
 
3.3.3.5 Preliminary conclusion with respect to the euro area Model CACs 
There are no international standard CACs, and the efficiency of a CAC is closely connected to 
the way it is drafted. Not all types of CAC are equally effective in solving the problems of minor-
ity holdout creditors and subsequent holdout litigation attempts. In the previous sections I have 
examined the features of the euro area Model CAC. Even though I have argued that some of 
its features are weak, I will nevertheless contend that the model CAC significantly enhances 
the overall prospects for successful restructuring.
178
 The core features which contribute to 
easing debt restructuring are the provisions allowing for a super-majority of creditors to im-
pose restructuring terms on minority holdout creditors. Additionally, the fact that the euro 
zone countries implement mandatory CACs in all sovereign bonds may contribute to setting a 
market standard and making it easier for developing- and emerging markets to implement 
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CACs in their respective bonds. The concept of CACs has existed a long time, but the inclu-
sion of the clause in sovereign debt contracts has usually been voluntary. Some sovereign 
debtors have not included CACs in their bonds because they are afraid that they are sending a 
message to the market that they are more likely to default than countries that do not include 
CACs in their bonds. Countries that do not have an AAA credit rating, in particular, may be 
afraid that investors do not want to invest in bonds with CACs.  Legal scholars have argued 
that some investors may prefer sovereign bonds with contract terms that increase the likeli-
hood of a taxpayer-funded bailout, in case the sovereign encounters financial difficulty. CACs 
are often seen as bailout substitutes and many investors may thus prefer sovereign bonds 
without CACs. However, as the same legal scholars have also pointed out, the fact that inves-
tors might not want CACs does not necessarily mean that official sector actors should refrain 
from attempting to influence bond contracts. On the contrary, in the article ‘Reforming Sover-
eign Lending Practices’ by Weidemaier, he points out that ‘encouragement, suasion, and other 
non-coercive methods often will fail to dislodge entrenched contacting practices’.179 Based on 
an empirical study of contract change after both disruptive events and persuasive initiatives 
from the official sector, he further concludes that ‘change may require fairly assertive, official 
sector intervention’.180 The treaty providing for the euro area model CAC is one such official 
sector intervention. The euro area Model CAC is an important step towards broader imple-
mentation of CACs because it includes a number of economically significant states. Addition-
ally, it is important because when the euro area takes a leading role in implementing CACs, 
they show that even countries with quite solid economies (such as Germany) find it reasona-
ble and affordable to introduce CACs into their sovereign bonds, making it easier for other 
countries to follow suit. 
 
3.4 Preliminary conclusions with respect to legislative action 
3.4.1 Comparative analysis 
The three legislative initiatives presented in this chapter all seek to avoid what the respective 
legislators have perceived to be a challenge to a sound restructuring process: minority holdout 
creditors and creditors suing the sovereign debtor to obtain full payment under the original 
loan agreement. The three legal approaches do however vary quite a lot with regard to their 
content and effects. These differences are discussed below and demonstrated in figure 3.  
 
The first obvious difference between the examined legislative initiatives is that they use dif-
ferent types of tools to achieve their goals, namely the introduction of ‘mandatory’ contractual 
provisions; immunisation of property; and the implementation of procedural limitations by 
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putting a cap on certain money claims and the execution of certain money claims. This can be 
seen in the first row of the table.  
 
Figure 3: Differences between holdout legislation 
 
                      Legislation 
 
 
Characteristics  
Belgium The UK Euro area countries 
 
     Type of tool 
 
Immunisation of prop-
erty, by statute 
Statutory limitation on 
the enforcement of 
contractual rights 
Contractual provision 
 
Activation of the tool 
 
After restructuring After restructuring* 
Before/ during restruc-
turing 
 
Relevance in  case of 
litigation 
 
Enforcement stage 
Judgment on the mer-
its & enforcement 
stage 
Judgment on the mer-
its 
 
Jurisdictional reach 
 
Enforcement of both 
national and foreign 
judgments and awards 
within Belgian juris-
diction 
Judgments on the mer-
its in UK courts (re-
gardless of which law 
a contract is subject 
to); contracts subject 
to UK law;  enforce-
ment of national and 
foreign judgments and 
awards in the UK;  
enforcement of UK 
judgments in foreign 
jurisdictions 
All jurisdictions 
 
Type of debt  
included 
All sovereign debt HIPC debt Sovereign bonds  
General incentive for 
creditors to participate 
in restructurings 
Limited effect 
Strong effect for the 
type of debt included 
Potentially strong ef-
fect 
 
Another difference, shown in the second row of the table, is related to whether the legislation 
is meant to improve the chances that creditors will participate in restructurings, or whether it 
is meant to reduce the potential negative consequences of a restructuring with holdout credi-
tors. This factor is connected to the question of the point in the ‘life cycle’ of a debt dispute 
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that the legislation meant to affect, which is further connected to the question of what role the 
legislation plays in litigation (see row three). The Belgian statute does not regulate the restruc-
turing process itself, nor does it interfere with the possibility of a holdout creditor obtaining a 
judgment on the merits in general. The Belgian legislation prevents holdout creditors from 
seizing certain types of property by immunising official development aid and governmental 
loans. It focuses solely on the enforcement stage of the ‘life cycle’ of a sovereign debt dis-
pute, after restructuring has taken place. The UK statute regulates situations in which debt 
restructurings has already taken place, and a holdout creditor seeks to obtain a judgment on 
the merits (a money judgment) or tries to enforce such a judgment. Compared to Belgian law, 
it therefore seems to have a broader approach. The euro area Model CAC seeks to resolve a 
debt dispute in its initial phase, before or during a restructuring. A CAC is implemented at the 
contracting stage, and is designed to facilitate coordination amongst creditors during restruc-
turing. The goal is to ensure that there will be no holdout creditors in a future restructuring 
process, by enabling the majority to bind the minority. If a CAC works properly, this implies 
that a holdout creditor will not succeed in a claim for full repayment in a lawsuit against a 
sovereign debtor. For these reasons, CACs are likely to reduce the need for legislation regu-
lating enforcement of a debt judgment (such as the Belgian statute). 
 
The three legislative initiatives also differ as to their reach, or in other words, the extent to 
which they have effect outside their own jurisdictions (row four in the table). The Belgian 
statute immunises from enforcement measures both official development aid and governmen-
tal loans that pass through Belgium. This property is immune both when national and foreign 
debt judgments and awards are enforced within Belgian jurisdiction. It is however questiona-
ble whether the statute will have any effect if a holdout creditor tries to seize official devel-
opment aid or governmental loans after it has passed through Belgian jurisdiction. It is also 
questionable whether foreign courts will attach much importance to the Belgian statute if a 
holdout creditor brings a lawsuit outside the Belgian jurisdiction. The UK Act regulates law-
suits within the UK, both where a holdout creditor seeks to obtain a judgment on the merits 
confirming its right to payment in accordance with the original non-restructured loan agree-
ment (regardless of the law applicable to the contract), and when a holdout creditor seeks to 
seize property in fulfilment of such a judgment. The latter category of lawsuits also includes 
execution of foreign judgments and awards, which ‘expands’ the jurisdictional scope of the 
legislation. Furthermore, UK judgments enforced in foreign jurisdictions will also be limited 
by the same maximum cap laid down in the UK statute. The euro area Model CAC treaty re-
quires that all euro area countries include a certain standard CAC in their sovereign bonds. 
Because CACs are contractual provisions, courts of all jurisdictions are in principle obliged to 
accept legitimate restructurings decided by majority bondholders. It is assumed that majority 
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voting provisions are accepted within most jurisdictions.
181
 The CAC- based approach can 
hence be said to be the most far reaching of the three legislative actions, when it comes to its 
impact in other jurisdictions. 
 
The legislative initiatives examined encompass different types of debt and therefore different 
amounts of debt contracts (row five). The Belgian statute encompasses all intents of seizing 
developing aid or governmental loans, meaning that all types of debt contracts are potentially 
‘protected’. The relevant debt under the UK statute is limited to HIPC debt, while the euro 
area Model CAC will be effective for all euro country sovereign bonds.  
 
As the examination of each of the legislative initiatives has shown, I argue that they also vary 
as to the actual effect on creditors’ general incentives to participate in sovereign debt restruc-
turings (row six). While the Belgian statute only immunises a small selection of property, 
holdout creditors are still free to attach all other kinds of property in order to enforce a hold-
out claim. Holdout creditors may still obtain a judgment reaffirming the right to payment in 
accordance with the original loan contract of a non-restructured debt, and attach all property 
except official development aid and official loans passing through Belgium. The Belgian ap-
proach may be described as ‘treating’ the symptoms of holdouts from restructuring, whilst 
creating little incentive of significance for creditors to participate in restructurings in the fu-
ture. A holdout creditor litigating in the UK knows it is unlikely that he will obtain more via a 
lawsuit than what he would have received if the debt had been reduced in accordance with the 
HIPC initiative. Hence, the UK statute constitutes a strong incentive for holdout creditors not 
to pursue full payment for non-restructured debts, but instead to accept to participate in the 
debt relief initiative. All debts other than HIPC-debt however remain unregulated and open to 
litigation and execution within the UK. With respect to the euro area Model CAC, I argue 
that, even though some of its features are quite weak, it may significantly enhance the overall 
prospects for successful restructuring in the relevant countries. Because it includes a number 
of economically significant states, the Model CAC may also contribute to setting a market 
standard and encourage an increase in the use of CACs in sovereign bonds in the future.  
 
Each of the three legislative initiatives covers a different area in which holdout creditors can 
impede the positive impact of a restructuring. As just described, the legal initiatives are, 
though to varying degrees, likely to have a positive impact on the outcome of sovereign debt 
restructurings. If one compares the general statements and condemnations of holdout behav-
iour made by politicians during preparatory work on legislation to the actual effects of the UK 
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and the Belgian legislation, the results seems quite limited. From a theoretical point of view, 
some of the negative consequences of creditors holding out from restructuring processes have 
indeed been corrected by these initiatives. However, there are still several ways in which 
creditors may succeed in holding out from restructuring and may subsequently use litigation 
to claim full payment, despite the enactment of legislation. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Observations  
The analysis in chapter 3 has been mostly theoretical, examining the assumed effects of the 
three legislative initiatives when it comes to creditors’ participation in sovereign debt restruc-
turings. In the previous section I concluded that the relevant legislation in Belgium, the UK 
and the euro zone has not managed to curb all holdout behaviour by minority creditors in rela-
tion to sovereign debt restructurings. It may be asked whether there is actually a need for 
more comprehensive regulation to ensure creditors participate in restructurings and to prevent 
creditor law suits claiming full repayment in accordance with the non-restructured debt con-
tract. Some would argue that there are still practical hindrances that constitute major obstacles 
for holdout creditors, preventing them from prevailing in sovereign debt disputes. As ex-
plained in chapter 2, the enforcement of creditor rights is in practice limited for two main rea-
sons. First, sovereign debt is not normally backed by collateral and there may be a limited 
number of attachable governmental assets located outside national borders. Second, the prin-
ciple of sovereign immunity, especially immunity from attachment, protects the assets of a 
sovereign even when the property is located in a foreign jurisdiction.
182
 Despite the gradual 
softening of the principle of sovereign immunity since the 1950s, the principle still compli-
cates the execution of sovereign debt claims in practice. For these reasons, the ‘holes’ in the 
discussed legislation may not be decisive for an actual holdout creditor seeking full payment 
of non-restructured debt via a lawsuit. In the following section I will discuss some empirical 
evidence which sheds light on the question of whether there is a need for further regulation to 
ensure that more creditors participate in sovereign debt restructurings and to prevent creditors 
from bringing subsequent lawsuits to obtain full payment under the original loan terms.  
 
A paper by Das, Papaioannou and Trebech examines sovereign debt restructurings between 
1950 and 2010 through a literature survey, data and stylized facts.
183
 They find that ‘[d]ebt 
renegotiations have become quicker and less disputed since the 1980s and 1990s’.184 Further, they 
find that most bond restructurings in the last 15 years have been relatively smooth: the re-
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structuring agreements were implemented within one or two years and creditor participation 
exceeded 90 per cent. The two main exceptions to this tendency are the Argentina case in 
2005 and the Dominica case in 2004.
185
 
 
Regarding creditor litigation against debtor governments, the paper states that ‘runs to the 
courthouse’ are widely regarded by scholars as the main obstacle to sovereign debt restructur-
ings and debt relief initiatives in low-income countries.
186
 According to the IMF and the 
World Bank, the volume of claims filed against HIPCs alone has surpassed US$2 billion, 
which is higher than the volume of debt relief that should have been provided by commercial 
creditors to these countries. Some of the claims filed account for a considerable share of GDP 
and the government’s annual budget. The paper further refers to a new comprehensive data-
base tracking all creditor litigation within the sphere of sovereign debt. Firstly, the data indi-
cates that most sovereign debt litigation has little to do with defaults or restructurings and is 
more often related to other types of government liabilities (i.e. unpaid energy bills or trade 
invoices). Second, the data shows that the number of default-related lawsuits in New York 
and London has increased since the 1980s and more than half of all default-related cases were 
initiated after the year 2000.
187
 At the same time the paper clearly shows that the overall num-
ber of cases is rather small: between 1980 and 2010, 109 cases were filed against debtor gov-
ernments in connection with a default on sovereign bonds or loans.
188
 Figure 4, on the next 
page, shows the distribution of cases across time.
189
 
 
To sum up, there has been an increase in default-related creditor litigation. At the same time, 
the overall number of these cases is still quite low. Furthermore, the number of sovereign de-
faults and restructurings has gone down in the last ten years. The time spent on each restruc-
turing is also quite low. This indicates that the contractual, market-based approach with vol-
untary restructurings has worked reasonably well in securing creditor participation and avoid-
ing protracted negotiations.190 With respect to the three legislative initiatives examined in this 
thesis, it can be said that they all contribute to solving specific problems that have occurred in 
the different countries (and areas). Based on the empirical evidence presented in this section, 
and despite holes in the relevant laws of Belgium, the UK and the euro area, one may argue 
that holdouts and subsequent litigation do not constitute a problem of significance. As all reg-
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ulation comes at a cost and may have unintended effects, it may not be desirable to introduce 
further regulation to improve the incentives to restructure and prevent holdout litigation. 
 
Figure 4: Creditor Litigation after Defaults/Restructurings: New Cases Filed per 
Year 
 
‘The figure shows the number of initiated creditor litigation cases against debtor governments 
for each year between 1980 and 2010. Only lawsuits relating to sovereign bonds or loans are  
considered and only those filed in the United States and the United Kingdom. The spike in  
1990 is due to the large number of cases initiated against Peru in the run-up to its Brady deal 
[a restructuring agreement], while the increase in case numbers after 2001relates to the dozens 
of lawsuits following Argentina’s default’.191 
 
The theoretical analysis and empirical evidence upon which I have based my conclusions in 
chapter 3, are based on the situation as it was until the year 2010. In the next chapter I will 
examine more recent episodes that have led to new legal developments, which may give rise 
to concern about potential collective action problems amongst creditors that could hamper 
future restructurings. 
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4 New legal developments - Future challenges in the wake of the 
2001 Argentine default  
In this chapter, I will present recent legal developments within the sphere of sovereign debt 
litigation, which have arisen in the aftermath of the 2001 Argentine defaults. I will focus on 
the outcome of litigation before the Second Circuit District Court of New York (the District 
Court) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. the Republic of Argentina and Abaclat and Others v. Argentina.
192
 My aim is 
to examine whether the outcome of these cases may have an impact on 1) the future participa-
tion of creditors in sovereign debt restructuring and 2) the effectiveness of the legislation ex-
amined in chapter 3, when it comes to handling holdout problems. In relation to the first dis-
pute, I will discuss two legal outcomes in particular, namely the content of the District Court’s 
novel interpretation of a pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts and the court’s issuance 
of an injunction in connection to the pari passu payment order. Concerning the ICSID pro-
ceedings, I will examine the possible consequences of ICSID accepting jurisdiction over a 
sovereign debt dispute for the first time. Before turning to the actual legal outcomes of the 
legal proceedings, I will start by presenting the background to the disputes arising from the 
Argentine default. 
 
4.1 The background to the Argentine sovereign debt litigation  
In 2001, Argentina suffered a major economic crisis and defaulted on its external debt pay-
ments. A great portion of these debts stemmed from bonds issued in the 1990s and were gov-
erned by the Fiscal Agency Agreement (the FAA).
193
 In 2005 and 2010, Argentina managed 
to get the holders of some 93 per cent of the bonds governed by the FAA to agree to exchange 
their bonds for new ones. When accepting this agreement, the exchange bondholder had to 
forego between 71 per cent and 75 per cent of the principal payable under the FAA Bonds. 
Approximately 7 per cent of the holders of FAA Bonds declined to accept the bond exchange. 
These holdout creditors consisted of hedge funds and other distressed asset investors who had 
purchased the FAA Bonds on the secondary market, often at a steep discount, at various 
points in time up until June 2001.
194
 Argentina continued to make payments to the holders of 
the Exchange Bonds but did not make any payments to those creditors still holding the de-
faulted FAA Bonds. In fact, Argentina passed legislation (the ‘Lock Law’) which imposed a 
temporary moratorium on the original FAA Bonds prohibiting the government from repaying 
the holdout creditors.
 195
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Later, in proceedings brought before various instances all over the world, the holdout credi-
tors tried to attach Argentine property in order to satisfy the payments due and unpaid. The 
most notorious cases are probably connected to the investment fund NML Capital’s attempt to 
seize a military vessel in Ghana and the airplane of Argentina’s president.196 As I will discuss 
in the following sections, the outcome of two sets of proceedings stemming from the Argen-
tine default may have a major effect on future sovereign debt restructurings. One case has its 
origin in a New York District Court and the other is currently taking place in the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  
 
4.2 NML Capital, Ltd. v. the Republic of Argentina: the pari passu clause and 
the corresponding injunction 
4.2.1 Introduction 
A subset of the holdout creditors from the Argentine restructurings, led by NML Capital, 
brought proceedings against Argentina in the court of the Southern District of New York (the 
District Court), with principal and past-due interest claims. According to the Fiscal Agency 
Agreement (FAA), the bond contracts were to be governed by the laws of the State of New 
York and any action brought by a bondholder arising out of or based on the bonds or the FAA 
was conferred to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York City.
197
 On 7 December 2011, the 
District Court issued a summary judgment in favour of the claimant NML Capital. The court 
held that Argentina had violated the Equal Treatment Provision (the pari passu clause) of the 
FAA, by lowering the rank of the plaintiffs’ bond ‘when it made payments currently due un-
der the Exchange Bonds, while persisting in its refusal to satisfy its payment obligations cur-
rently due under [the plaintiffs’] Bonds’ and second when it enacted the ‘Lock Law’, which 
made it illegal to make payments to the holdout creditors.
198
 On 23 February 2012, this judg-
ment was amended with a reaffirming order stating that, according to the pari passu provision 
in the FAA, Argentina was obliged to make a ‘rateable payment’ to the plaintiff NML Capital 
whenever it paid any amount due on the Exchange Bonds.
199
 The prevailing argument was 
that contracts have to be upheld to secure trust in the financial market in general and to secure 
trust in New York as a jurisdiction which respects and upholds financial agreements. Antici-
pating that Argentina would refuse to comply with the payment order, the District Court also 
issued an injunction prohibiting ‘all parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon, 
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment on the Exchange Bonds’ without also mak-
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ing a ‘Rateable Payment’ to NML Capital.200 The District Court further confirmed that the 
indenture trustee and third-party financial intermediaries could face contempt of court if they 
were to process prohibited payments made by Argentina on the restructured bonds. Argentina 
appealed both the interpretation of the pari passu clause and the issuance of the injunction to 
the Second Circuit, and later to the Supreme Court. In October 2013 and in June 2014, the 
Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeals without any comment, thereby rendering 
the lower court’s decision final.201  
 
Ever since the restructuring of Argentina’s debts, the country had respected its payment obli-
gations towards its exchange creditors. On 16 June 2014, Argentina transferred approximately 
€225.9 million to an account that the trustee of the euro denominated exchange bonds, the 
Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon),  held with the Banco Central de la Republica Ar-
gentina in Argentina.
202
 Due to the District Court’s injunction, BNY Mellon did not forward 
to the bondholders the payment due on 30 July 2014, which again triggered a default on Ar-
gentina’s performing debt. Argentina still refuses to repay the holdout creditors and has still 
not managed to pay the amounts due to the exchange bondholders. 
  
4.2.2 The Pari Passu Clause 
The pari passu clause which the District Court interpreted in NML Capital, Ltd. v. the Repub-
lic of Argentina is a standard clause in both public and private international unsecured debt 
obligations.
203
 Pari passu is Latin for something close to ‘on equal footing’. At a general level 
it can be said that the clause is meant to secure the equal treatment of creditors. The specific 
content of the clauses, especially in sovereign debt contracts, has for a long time been exam-
ined and debated by academics, without the different actors coming to an agreement. The Dis-
trict Court’s interpretation of pari passu, which will createprecedent within US law, gives 
holdout creditors a right to be paid at the same rate, relative to the respective debt obligations, 
and at the same time as those who have accepted to reschedule. The judgment order does not 
state that Argentina has an obligation to pay its creditors at a certain time, but rather that Ar-
gentina must pay the holdout creditors if it pays the creditors who have accepted the restruc-
turing.  
 
Pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts subject to US law now ensure that restructuring 
creditors have no right to priority over holdout creditors, when it comes to actual payment. 
The US pari passu interpretation gives holdout creditors a stronger right to fulfilment of their 
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original (non-restructured) contract claims and may therefore increase the incentives for mi-
nority creditors to hold out from sovereign debt restructurings. Furthermore, the servicing of 
debt obligations is dependent on the sovereign debtor’s limited resources. This may lead to a 
situation where the restructuring creditors have to accept a poorer restructuring agreement 
(bigger losses and lower payments further into the future) because the sovereign debtor must 
also have sufficient funds to repay the original claims of holdout creditors. Such a situation 
clearly constitutes a disincentive for creditors to take part in restructurings in general. For the 
sovereign borrower, the interpretation of the pari passu clause also has another negative ef-
fect: if sovereign borrowers must repay all creditors, including holdout creditors, in accord-
ance with the rateable payment formula, this may imply bigger cuts in their own national 
budgets. Additional cuts may be suboptimal both for the sovereign debtor, the holdout- and 
the restructuring creditor, considering the state’s chances for economic growth and crisis reso-
lution.  
 
Figure 5 below shows that the language used in the Argentine pari passu clause, or function-
ally similar language, has become more common, especially since the 1990s.
204
 The figure is 
based on a sample of bonds issued in foreign capital markets and governed by foreign law. 
The figure divides pari passu clauses into three categories: 1) clauses that seem only to prom-
ise that the issuer will maintain the equal ranking of its bonds; (2) clauses, like Argentina’s, 
that imply an equal payment obligation; and (3) clauses that contain an explicit promise of 
equal payment. Almost half of the bonds issued after 2000 included the language found in the 
Argentine bond, which highlights the potential significance of the NML Capital, Ltd. v. Ar-
gentina for other bond issuances.  
 
Figure 5: Different versions of pari passu over time 
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4.2.3 The Injunction 
There may be a legal right to the property of a sovereign debtor, for example in fulfilment of a 
debt obligation, but it may nonetheless be difficult to execute the property in practice. In sov-
ereign debt disputes, immunity from attachment often constitutes a practical obstacle to credi-
tors seeking to execute a money judgment (see sections 2.4.4 and 3.3.3.5). The District 
Court’s interpretation of pari passu may strengthen creditors’ legal rights. It is however an-
other question altogether to ask whether or not these legal rights will be effective in practice. 
The injunction issued by the District Court in NML Capital, Ltd. v. the Republic of Argentina 
forbids all parties involved from contributing, either directly or indirectly, to facilitating any 
payment on the Exchange Bonds without also making a ‘Rateable Payment’ to NML Capi-
tal.
205
 This injunction, issued to enforce the payment obligation in accordance with the pari 
passu clause, may prove to be just as important as the new interpretation of the pari passu 
clause, when it comes to strengthening holdout creditors’ rights.  
 
The District Court’s injunction in the NML case comes after years of attempts by the holdout 
creditors to seize Argentine property, which have mainly failed due to the rules on sovereign 
immunity. The injunction formulated by the District Court seeks to enforce the pari passu-
order using the ‘help’ of third parties involved in the process of paying the bondholders that 
have accepted the restructuring. An ordinary outstanding money judgment against a sovereign 
debtor, without the support of the injunction described, will often commit the debtor country 
to a constant stream of legal fees and evasive manoeuvers to avoid seizure of its property, so 
as to accomplish external diplomatic, military, and commercial objectives. Outstanding mon-
ey judgments may also prevent the sovereign debtor from borrowing money on the financial 
markets.
206
 The use of the injunction in connection with a pari passu payment order will not 
necessarily hinder a sovereign debtor from accessing the credit market. Neither will it hinder 
states from engaging in commercial transactions in the way the immunity rules do when a 
sovereign debtor tries to avoid ordinary enforcement of a money judgment. The injunction 
issued by the District Court will rather impair the sovereign debtor’s ability to service existing 
restructured debt, because no bank, trustee or other financial intermediary will help execute 
the payment when it falls due. Furthermore, by ‘using’ third parties to force the sovereign 
debtor to comply with the payment order, the injunction is not affected by the rules on sover-
eign immunity. If the sovereign debtor does not comply with the payment order, the result 
will be that the sovereign debtor defaults on in its payment obligations with regard to the 
creditors who actually accepted the restructuring agreement in the first place. This is what 
happened in Argentina’s case in August 2014. For these reasons, the consequences of the in-
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junction can prove to be just as costly as not complying with a money judgment itself.
207
 The 
injunction provides a powerful tool because the sovereign debtor is faced with the alternative 
of obeying the court order or not paying the exchange creditors, which can have potentially 
huge disruptive consequences for the economy of a sovereign debtor.  
 
The next question is how the use of this type of injunction in connection with sovereign debt 
judgments may affect the incentives for creditors to participate in debt restructurings. Regard-
ing the 2012 proceedings in NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, Professor Ste-
phen Choi from New York University Law School was asked to give an opinion on the possi-
ble consequences of the District Court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause and its Febru-
ary 2012 injunction.
208
 Amongst other subjects, he commented on the judgment and the in-
junction’s effect on the ability of sovereigns facing financial distress to restructure their sov-
ereign debt.
209
 In short, Choi concludes that the opinion of the District Court and its injunction 
‘materially increase the risk of non-payment for the Exchange bondholders’. This is in line 
with the examination in the previous section. Choi further concludes that the legal opinion 
‘materially undermines the ability of sovereigns in financial distress to engineer value-
increasing debt restructurings that would benefit the sovereign and the group of all sovereign 
debt holders’.210 With respect to the effects on participating creditors, Choi further notes that, 
instead of being rewarded for their sacrifice in 2005 and 2010 when they turned their bonds in 
for the Exchange Bonds and took a large ‘haircut’ in value, the Exchange bondholders face an 
increased risk of non-payment because of the pari passu order and the February 2012 injunc-
tion.
211
  
 
Two English judges have, in a case before English courts, also commented on the effects of 
the same injunction issued by the New York District Court in relation to the pari passu pay-
ment order.
212
 The Bank of New York Mellon (BNY Mellon), as trustee for the holders of the 
Argentine exchanged Eurobonds, was one of the parties subject to the US District Court’s 
injunction. BNY Mellon was, as previously mentioned, forced to withhold payments due in 
July 2014, which the Euro Bondholders are entitled to receive under their bond contracts. The 
complicating factor in this case is that when Argentina issued new bonds in exchange for the 
defaulted bonds, some were denominated in US dollars, others in Argentine pesos, and others 
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in euros. The euro-denominated bonds in this issue were to be governed by English law and 
Argentina irrevocably conferred these securities to the jurisdiction of the Courts of England. 
The Eurobond holders therefore sought a declaration in English courts stating that a foreign 
court’s order [the US District Court’s injunction] could not modify a contract governed by 
English law.
213
 They argued that the US injunction should not be a legitimate excuse for BNY 
Mellon to actually withhold payments due under the English contract between BNY Mellon 
and Euro Bondholders. The declaration was denied by the English court on the grounds that it 
would serve ‘no useful purpose’. As the court stated, the declaration would amount to little 
more than ‘a declaration that the trustee would be in breach of trust unless it had a defence’.214 
However, as mentioned, both of the judges handling the case made some interesting com-
ments with respect to the consequences of the US District Court’s injunction and its effect on 
third party creditors (such as those who had accepted the Argentine restructuring):  
 
‘… the present position is rather unfortunate, albeit explicable by the understandable 
concern of the United States Courts that their [payment] orders should be obeyed: the 
bondholders (who, or whose predecessors, will already have had to agree to take far 
less than the face value of the FAA Bonds that they will once have held) would be lia-
ble to be prevented indefinitely from obtaining access to money that had been due to 
them contractually and to which they would now be beneficially entitled.’215  
 
One of the judges, Mr. Justice Newey, here raises a concern about the fairness of the New 
York District Court’s injunctive measures with respect to the creditors who have accepted the 
restructuring and have already participated in the losses arising from the Argentine default in 
2001. His stated concern is in line with the analysis of Professor Choi, who argues that the 
District Court’s injunction makes future repayment more uncertain for exchange bondholders. 
The choice of accepting a restructuring offer normally consists in accepting some loss (bonds 
with lower value) in exchange for getting paid in the near future. Accepting a restructuring 
agreement is not usually associated with the risk of not getting paid at all, or only getting paid 
if the holdout creditors receive full payment. However, if minority holdout creditors can ef-
fectively hinder the fulfilment of an agreement between exchange bondholders and sovereigns 
issuing bonds, the chances that a creditor will accept the losses associated with a restructuring 
are rather low. If the type of injunction issued by the New York District Court becomes stand-
ard in sovereign debt disputes, it is reasonable to assume that this will make it less attractive 
for creditors to actually take part in and accept a restructuring agreement. 
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When discussing the New York District Court’s interpretation of the pari passu and the in-
junction’s effect on debt restructuring processes in general, it is important to bear in mind that 
this interpretation is obviously not binding for courts in other jurisdiction. It is not given that 
courts outside the USA will follow this interpretation in their own cases. For example, the 
comments made by the English judges may indicate that English courts are unlikely to inter-
pret the pari passu clause as the New York District Court has done in future cases, nor are 
they likely to implement an injunction that affects the contractual rights of third parties to the 
same extent. However, many debt contracts in general, and as many as 40 per cent of all in-
ternational sovereign bonds, are subject to the jurisdiction of New York.
216
 The interpretation 
of the pari passu clause and the use of the corresponding injunction have now created a cer-
tain precedent within the USA and this may have profound effects on future sovereign debt 
disputes.  
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I argue that the new interpretation of pari passu and the 
corresponding injunction provide a strong new tool for holdout creditors and constitute an 
incentive for creditors to holdout from sovereign debt restructurings. An objection to this 
view may be that it is too early to predict the long-term consequences of NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
The Republic of Argentina. As some have pointed out, the Argentine case is quite exceptional 
in that few sovereigns have the guts to pursue litigation for over a decade. On the other hand, 
the formulation of the pari passu clause that was the basis for litigation in this case is com-
mon in current outstanding sovereign debt contracts (see figure 5 in section 4.2.2).
217
 Fur-
thermore, in the aftermath of the injunction issued in the NML Capital case, at least one copy-
cat lawsuit has been brought by Taiwan to collect on Grenada’s defaulted debts. This hap-
pened only six months after the Second Circuit’s ruling and could be an indication of what is 
to come.
218
 There may therefore be reason to believe that market actors also consider these 
legal developments as effective tools for holdout creditors. 
 
4.2.4 The effect on the examined legislation  
I have just concluded that the novel interpretation of the pari passu clause combined with the 
far-reaching injunction provides a potentially strong tool for minority holdout creditors who 
seek full repayment in accordance with the original (non-restructured) loan agreement. I will 
now examine whether these legal outcomes will have any effects on the previously examined 
legislation from Belgium, the UK and the euro area. 
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In Belgium, certain types of property have been protected (immunised) through national legis-
lation. The injunction issued in connection with the pari passu payment order is a means of 
forcing the debtor country to accept the court order and pay the money claim. When a pari 
passu payment order operates in cooperation with the type of injunction issued by the District 
Court, there is no need for a holdout creditor to seize any property in fulfilment of a payment 
claim. The pari passu clause and the injunction do not interfere with rules on sovereign im-
munity from enforcement, which means that the specific funds immunised in Belgium will 
still be untouchable, and that the Belgian legislation remains intact. At the same time, the in-
centive to hold out from debt restructurings has increased as a result of the pari passu inter-
pretation and the use of the corresponding injunction, and the Belgian legislation will not be 
able to curb this development.    
 
The UK legislation puts a cap on funds recoverable on claims concerning so-called Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt. UK courts are obviously not bound by the precedent set 
in US courts regarding the interpretation of the pari passu clause or the use of the broad in-
junction. Furthermore, as described in section 4.2.2, there is reason to believe that English 
courts will not interpret the pari passu clause in the same way as the New York District Court 
did. The District Court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause may however affect the effec-
tiveness of the UK Act in cases where enforcement of a US sovereign debt judgment is sought 
within the UK. The execution of a US judgment in the UK has to be done in accordance with 
the relevant law on civil procedure, including potential obligations pursuant to treaties be-
tween states on the enforcement of judgments from other jurisdictions, and the Debt Relief 
(Developing Countries) Act. It is possible that there may be an internal inconsistency between 
these two sets of rules. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into this question, but what 
can be said is that the solution in case of such a conflict will depend on the hierarchy of rules 
in the laws of the United Kingdom. For now, I will draw the simplified conclusion that execu-
tion within the United Kingdom of a US judgment concerning a debt claim based on a pari 
passu interpretation, may be moderated or restricted by the Debt Relief (Developing Coun-
tries) Act. 
 
As explained in chapter 3, the UK Act does apply to enforcement in the UK of awards and 
foreign judgments handed down in other jurisdictions, and these awards and judgments may 
only be enforced for the reduced amount.
219
 Imagine a situation where a creditor seeks en-
forcement of a pari passu payment order from a US court in the UK. The payment order con-
cerns a non-restructured HIPC debt. UK courts will provide the holdout creditors with their 
share of the payments on outstanding debts, and these payments will be made at the same time 
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as the payments to other creditors. However, the holdout creditors’ share will be reduced in 
accordance with what is considered sustainable within the HIPC framework. The rateable 
payment formula, as it is interpreted by the District Court, will therefore be modified. The UK 
legislation will, with respect to HIPC debts, succeed in ensuring that holdout creditors are not 
advantaged over participating creditors. Despite the increased incentives created by the NML 
Capital case, the UK Act has ensured that there is no extra incentive to hold out from the 
HIPC initiative. 
 
There is also another way in which the NY District Court orders may affect the UK Act: 
holdout creditors may choose not go to court in the UK to execute the US judgment, but in-
stead will rely on the US injunction on third parties to obtain full payment. If third parties 
choose to obey the injunction, they will refuse to execute payments (or to help in this task) 
from the sovereign debtor to the exchange bondholders, as long as the holdout creditors do 
not receive a rateable payment. One question arising is whether the sovereign debtor’s volun-
tary payment of its holdout creditors, after submitting to pressure from third parties under the 
injunction, is subject to the UK Act. According to the UK Act, payments in connection with 
compromise agreements on sovereign debt; restructured debt; payment orders on sovereign 
debt obtained through litigation; and execution of foreign payment judgments and awards, are 
all subject to the maximum cap.
220
 Payment by the sovereign debtor, under pressure from 
third parties obeying the US injunction, is nevertheless a voluntary payment based on the 
original contract. This type of payment is not listed in the UK Act directly, which suggests 
that a voluntary payment is not subject to the maximum cap. Furthermore, the injunction itself 
does not relate directly to the amount recoverable, which is at the core of the UK regulation. 
To a certain extent, the injunction seems able to circumvent the UK Act because it obliges 
third parties to apply pressure to the sovereign debtor to repay the debt under the original 
(non-restructured) loan agreement. On the other hand, voluntary payments avoiding the max-
imum cap is contrary to the aims of the legislation, namely to safeguard the fulfilment of the 
debt relief under the HIPC initiative. Whether such payment falls within the scope of the UK 
Act has not been tried in court and the result can be said to be uncertain. It is therefore diffi-
cult to determine the consequences of the pari passu order and the corresponding injunction 
for the UK Act.
221
 If voluntary payment in accordance with the original contract does fall 
within the scope of the UK Act, the holdout creditors’ claim will be modified in accordance 
with the maximum cap. It will however be difficult to ensure that voluntary payments made 
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by sovereign debtors to holdout creditors are also subject to the maximum cap laid down in 
the UK Act. If voluntary payment does not fall within the scope of the Act, the result will be 
that voluntary payments resulting from third party pressure under the US injunction must be 
accepted.  
 
With respect to the Model CAC introduced in the euro zone countries, the novel interpretation 
of pari passu and the corresponding injunction will not affect its objective in any significant 
sense. CACs, like pari passu clauses, are contractual provisions that bind the contracting par-
ties. The implementation of CACs in sovereign bonds ensures in principle that all courts and 
tribunals will accept a restructuring accepted by the majority of the creditors.  
 
4.2.5 Preliminary Conclusions 
In section 4.2, I have presented two important legal outcomes of NML Capital, Ltd. v. the Re-
public of Argentina, namely the novel interpretation of the pari passu clause and the use of a 
far-reaching injunction to enforce the sovereign debt payment order. I argue that these repre-
sent new legal tools in the sphere of sovereign debt disputes, which may affect the way credi-
tors act in relation to a sovereign debt restructuring.  
 
I argue that the pari passu interpretation provides stronger rights for holdout creditors and that 
these rights become effective through the issuance of the related injunction. Because the in-
junction avoids the ordinary attachment regime and the rules on sovereign immunity, it has 
managed to provide a more effective tool for holdout creditors to obtain full payment in ac-
cordance with the original non-restructured loan agreement. I also show that many outstand-
ing sovereign bonds contain a pari passu clause with wording similar to the clause in the 
NML Capital case. The outcome of the NML case may thus have consequences for a broad 
range of sovereign bonds. I also argue that the precedent created by the NML Capital case 
may lead to increased incentives for minority creditors to hold out from restructuring process-
es in general, which may present a challenge to the system of voluntary debt restructurings. 
 
With respect to the Belgium Act and the euro area Model CAC examined in chapter 3, I con-
clude that these laws will probably be unaffected by the legal developments. How and to what 
extent the legal developments will affect the UK Act is less clear. Regardless of how the three 
legal regimes are affected by these new legal tools, it is worth recalling the conclusions in 
section 3.4, namely that the Belgian and UK legislation in particular have a limited impact on 
overall incentives for minority creditors to participate in sovereign debt restructuring. The 
euro area Model CAC does however constitute a relatively strong tool, which has the potential 
to ease coordination problem amongst creditors in a restructuring process, and so contribute to 
a reduction in holdout litigation. The impact of the euro area Model CAC is therefore likely to 
counter the new legal developments.  
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The overall conclusion at this point is that 1) the legal outcomes of the NML Capital case 
constitute strong legal tools for minority holdout creditors, which increase the incentives for 
creditors to hold out from sovereign debt restructuring processes in general; 2) the new legal 
tools do not significantly weaken the Belgian legislation or the euro area Model CAC, both of 
which are aimed at encouraging participation in sovereign debt restructuring and reducing 
sovereign debt litigation; and 3) the legislation in Belgium and the UK has little impact on the 
increased incentives to hold out from sovereign debt restructurings created by the new legal 
tools of the NML Capital case. CACs, on the other hand, stand out as being the most robust 
means of handling the increased incentives for minority creditors to hold out from sovereign 
debt restructurings and of limiting sovereign debt litigation.   
 
4.3 Proceedings before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) 
4.3.1 Introduction  
The other legal development in the sphere of sovereign debt disputes, which will be described 
in this section, stems from legal proceedings before the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID is an autonomous international institution established 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States with over one hundred and forty member States.
222
 The primary purpose of 
ICSID is to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international investment dis-
putes. The legal basis of a claim connected to an international investment dispute under IC-
SID is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). A BIT may confer jurisdiction to a variety of inves-
tor-dispute settlement arbitration tribunals, but ICSID is one of the more common arbitration 
forums. BITs aim to attract foreign direct investment in less developed and emerging econo-
mies, by guaranteeing foreign investors the right to individual protection and, if necessary, the 
right to appropriate defence and compensation.
223
 For the ICSID to accept jurisdiction over an 
investment dispute, a legal dispute has to exist between one of the centre’s contracting mem-
ber states and a national of another contracting member state.
224
 Recourse to ICSID concilia-
tion and arbitration is entirely voluntary. However, once the parties have consented to arbitra-
tion under the ICSID Convention, neither party can unilaterally withdraw its consent.
225
  
  
Parallel to the proceedings in the New York District Court brought by NML Capital, 180,000 
Italian holders of defaulted Argentine debt pursued arbitration before ICSID through the so-
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called Task Force Argentina.
226
 The Task Force claimed compensatory damages due to Re-
spondent’s alleged breach of its obligations under the ‘Agreement between the Argentine Re-
public and the Republic of Italy on the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (The Argen-
tina-Italy BIT), signed in Buenos Aires on 22 May 1990.
227
 The case is named Abaclat and 
Others v. Argentina, and one of the questions raised was whether the claims fell within the 
scope of protection afforded by the Argentina-Italy BIT. In 2011 the majority of the ICSID 
Arbitral Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction and concluded for the first time that sovereign 
bonds may constitute an investment in the sense of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and 
Article 1 of the Argentina-Italy BIT.
228
 The award on the merits is still pending, but the deci-
sion on jurisdiction is itself quite important because this is the first time the ICSID has ac-
cepted jurisdiction over a sovereign debt dispute. Up until now, sovereign debt disputes have 
been brought before national courts, and occasionally ordinary arbitral tribunals, one of which 
is normally the designated court in sovereign loan contracts. (In Abaclat v. Argentina, ICSID 
was not the designated court under the loan contract). 
 
4.3.2 Consequences of ICSID accepting jurisdiction over Sovereign Debt Disputes 
As explained in the section above, the majority of the ICSID tribunal concluded that sover-
eign bonds fell under the Argentina-Italy BIT and that ICSID was competent to hear such a 
claim. The scope of this thesis is too narrow to delve further into the content of the jurisdic-
tional requirements and the related question of what constitutes an investment according to 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. In the context of this thesis, the important point is to note 
the possibility that ICSID may in the future confirm jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes. 
Several features related to ICSID as an alternative litigation path may affect the incentives for 
different classes of creditors to hold out from debt restructurings. In the following I will ex-
amine three of these features. 
 
First, the traditional enforcement mechanism set out in Article 54 of the ICSID Convention is 
deemed to be quite strong. Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that each contract-
ing state must enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by ICSID arbitration awards ‘within 
its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that state’. State immunity from exe-
cution of property is still relevant when enforcing ICSID awards and provides some protec-
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tion under the ICSID Convention: Article 55 provides that ‘[n]othing in Article 54 shall be 
construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity of 
that State or of any foreign State from execution’. However, in practice it has been shown that 
the rate of compliance with ICSID awards is very high, compared to national court orders 
regarding sovereign debt disputes.
229
 If the likelihood of successful enforcement of holdout 
claims in sovereign debt disputes increases, other creditors are likely to be discouraged from 
participating in a restructuring offer because ‘[c]reditors will not be willing to take a loss 
knowing that holdouts may receive full payments elsewhere’.230 
 
Second, the bilateral approach taken in BITs introduces preferential treatment features: if sov-
ereign bonds are to be considered an investment in the sense of a BIT and the ICSID Conven-
tion, all creditors must be offered a restructuring on equally advantageous (or disadvantagous) 
terms. More precisely, the terms must be qualitatively the same, relative to the creditor’s share 
of the bonds and the type of bond (maturity, interest rate… etc.). When thousands of investors 
holding sovereign bonds are subject to restructuring, and the terms of the sovereign bonds 
vary, it will be harder to get the different bondholders to agree on what actually constitutes a 
restructuring offer on equal terms. If strict preferential treatment features get introduced into 
the restructuring process as a condition for valid restructuring, the necessary coordination 
among bondholders is likely to be more difficult.
231
 
 
Third, and this is perhaps the most remarkable consequence of ICSID accepting jurisdiction in 
sovereign debt disputes, the objective of CACs may be undermined.
232
 The reason for this is 
that in the sphere of investment treaty arbitration there is a distinction between contract claims 
and treaty claims. This has been accepted by a number of tribunals, including in Viviendi v. 
Argentina II:  
 
Articles 3 (fair and equitable treatment) and 5 (expropriation) of the BIT do not relate 
to breach of a municipal contract. Rather, they set an independent standard. A state 
may breach a treaty without breaching a contract; it may also breach a treaty at the 
same time it breaches a contract.
233 
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This means that a treaty claim may arise from a contractual relationship between foreign in-
vestors and the state where the investment takes place independently of the existence of a 
breach of contract.
234
 In other words, regardless of the contractual position of a debtor state 
under a relevant bond, it may still be found responsible for a breach of treaty obligations.
235
 
At the same time, a treaty claim cannot arise if the investor claim is based only on an alleged 
breach of contract by the state where the investment takes place (the host state).
236
 In Abaclat 
the tribunal classified the enactment and implementation of laws, such as ‘the Lock Law’, as 
acts independent of Argentina’s conduct as a party to the bond contracts. The tribunal further 
established that such acts constituted potential breaches of treaty obligations and not just a 
potential breach of a commercial contract. The result of this distinction between contract 
claims and treaty claims is that the ICSID tribunal may find that a sovereign debt restructur-
ing, or accompanying conditions, constitute a breach of the ICSID treaty despite the fact that 
the debt restructuring is in accordance with the CACs described in the debt contract between 
the parties. This implies that bondholders may be able to obtain compensation even though 
the ‘contractually prescribed majority of bondholders accepted the sovereign debt restructur-
ing’. 237 In other words, the CAC laid down in a bond contract may actually become ineffec-
tive in binding holdout creditors. As mentioned in section 3.3, the IMF, ICMA and the EU, 
through the euro Model CAC, do rely on CACs to reduce collective action problems and 
holdout litigation. Recourse to ICSID arbitration could thus ‘create a legal gap in the interna-
tional community’s collective action policy’.238  
 
4.3.3 The effect on the examined legislation  
I argue that these three features - the enforcement mechanism, preferential treatment features, 
and the differentiation between treaty claims and contract claims leading to a situation where 
CACs may be disregarded - all contribute to increase the overall incentives for minority credi-
tors to holdout from sovereign debt restructurings. In addition, the fact that ICSID has accept-
ed jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes may also affect the laws introduced in Belgium, 
the UK and in the euro area countries.  
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The Belgian legislation immunises certain funds and property through national legislation, to 
protect them from attachment in fulfilment of sovereign debt claims, for example. As dis-
cussed in section 4.3.2, there is evidence that it is easier to enforce ICSID awards than nation-
al or municipal court orders. This may suggest that ICSID’s acceptance of jurisdiction over 
sovereign debt disputes could weaken the protection set out in the Belgian Act. However, as 
previously mentioned, the ICSID Convention does specify that nothing in Article 54, which 
regulates enforcement, shall be construed as ‘derogating from the law in force in any Con-
tracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execution’. For 
these reasons, the fact that ICSID has accepted jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes is not 
likely to affect the Belgian legislation.  
 
As described in section 3.2, the UK Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act from 2010 puts a 
cap on certain recoverable funds in sovereign debt litigation in national courts.
239
 This cap 
also applies to enforcement of claims based on a foreign court order or arbitral award, includ-
ing ICSID awards. Thus the objective of the UK legislation is in principle intact.
240
 (A UK 
law putting a maximum cap on a claim regarding British debts would have been more prob-
lematic, because such a claim could be protected under the British BITs. A sovereign debt 
claim from a national of a third country against a foreign state does not however fall under the 
protection of a British BIT).  
 
I ended the previous section by describing how ICSID may undermine the objective of CACs. 
Such a situation will of course also affect the euro area Model CAC. If holdout creditors can 
seize an alternative court that disregards the contractual effects of CACs, the euro zone legis-
lation will be in danger of being a much weaker incentive to restructure than wished for. 
 
4.3.4 Preliminary conclusions 
In a recent case, Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, decided on 
9 April 2015, the ICSID tribunal seems to depart from previous reasoning with respect to its 
categorisation of sovereign bonds as an investment under the ICSID convention.
241
 The case 
concerns a dispute over an agreement between the government of Greece and Slovakia and 
Cyprus respectively, and the ICSID convention. The underlying dispute is related to Greek 
sovereign bonds and the debt restructuring carried out in 2012, but in this case the Tribunal 
only considered the question of jurisdiction. The award begins by considering whether the 
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Greek sovereign bond falls under the respective BITs. Due to unclear wording and incon-
sistent references to which obligations and securities constitute an investment under different 
Greek BITs, the ICSID Tribunal concluded that the sovereign bonds did not constitute an in-
vestment under the specific BITs. For these reasons, the ICSID Tribunal declined jurisdiction. 
However, in an obiter dictum the Tribunal chose to investigate whether the sovereign bonds in 
question could constitute an investment under the ICSID Convention.
242
 It is in this obiter 
dictum that the tribunal seems to disagree with the majority arbitrators of the Abaclat case and 
concludes that a sovereign bond does not constitute an investment under the ICSID conven-
tion. The majority of the tribunal highlights the fact that for something to be categorised as an 
investment in an economic sense, there has to be an element of contribution to the creation of 
value, as opposed to a process of exchange of values (for example, a sale). Furthermore, there 
has to be an element of duration and an element of risk. This risk is not the commercial risk 
or a sovereign (political) risk, but an operational risk. Such a risk is described as ‘inherent in 
the investment operation in its surrounding – meaning that the profits are not ascertained but 
depend on the success or failure of the economic venture concerned…’.243 The Tribunal ac-
cepted that there was an intended duration of possession of the Greek sovereign bonds. How-
ever, the Tribunal concluded that ‘the element of contribution to an economic venture and the 
existence of the specific operational risk that characterizes an investment under the objective 
approach are not present here’.244 The two judgments Abaclat and Poštová banka seem to 
contradict each other, and leave the question of whether ICSID will in the future accept juris-
diction in sovereign debt disputes (related to sovereign bonds) open and unsettled. Although 
there are case-specific circumstances that differentiate Abaclat from Poštová banka, the di-
verging outcomes in the two cases seem to be based on a difference of opinion amongst the 
arbitrators with respect to which requirements must be fulfilled for the ICSID to confirm ju-
risdiction. To my knowledge there is yet another sovereign debt dispute pending in which 
ICSID will have to consider whether to accept jurisdiction or not; this third case, may provide 
more certainty.  
 
It is not yet settled whether the ICSID will accept sovereign debt disputes in the future. How-
ever, if it does accept jurisdiction, there is a risk that it may disrupt the current system of sov-
ereign debt restructurings, which is based on a voluntary contractual approach. This disrup-
tion is mainly caused by the fact the ICSID may disregard CACs when deciding on whether 
there is a breach of the treaty or not, which may also invalidate restructuring agreements made 
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on the basis of CACs. Based on the examination in this chapter, I conclude that legislation in 
both the UK and Belgium is likely to be unaffected by the legal changes that will follow if 
ICSID accepts jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes. However, as these statutes have little 
effect on the overall incentives for sovereigns to restructure, they will not be able to correct 
the reinforced incentives for creditors to hold out that may arise if ICSID accepts jurisdiction 
in the above mentioned cases.  
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5 Concluding Remarks  
5.1 Final Conclusion  
In my thesis I consider the problem of creditor holdouts in sovereign debt restructurings and 
minority creditors who free ride on restructuring processes paid for by the majority creditors 
and the sovereign debtor. I examine whether legislation from Belgium, the UK and a euro 
area treaty has been successful in limiting the number of minority creditors who hold out from 
restructuring processes and litigate to obtain full payment under the original non-restructured 
loan agreement.  
 
In chapter 3, I discussed the effectiveness of the three legislative initiatives. This analysis was 
based on the legal framework of sovereign debt as it was prior to 2010. I found that the Bel-
gian Act, the UK Act and the euro area Model Collective Action Clause (CAC) cover differ-
ent situations in which a holdout creditor may impede sovereign debt restructuring and ham-
per the positive impact of such restructuring. I concluded that the legislation in Belgium and 
the UK is quite narrow and only has a limited effect on overall incentives for creditors to par-
ticipate in sovereign debt restructurings and refrain from sovereign debt litigation to obtain 
full payment under a non-restructured bond. The euro area Model CAC, on the other hand, is 
more comprehensive and powerful, because it aims to limit holdout opportunities for minority 
creditors by making it possible for the majority of the creditors to bind the minority to partici-
pate in a restructuring. The overall conclusion, based on a theoretical analysis of the three 
legislative approaches, is that all of them correct some of the negative consequences of credi-
tors holding out from restructuring processes. There are still several loopholes, however, leav-
ing various opportunities for creditors to successfully hold out from restructuring processes 
and subsequently litigate. 
 
My general and theoretical analysis indicates that there is a need for stronger regulation to 
obtain sufficient incentives to ensure successful sovereign debt restructurings and to dissuade 
minority creditors from free-riding on necessary restructuring processes. In section 3.4.2, I 
looked at empirical data on sovereign debt restructurings, sovereign debt litigation and hold-
out behaviour from 1980 to 2010, allowing me to test the conclusions of the general analysis. 
The data indicates that the problem of holdout creditors is relatively limited, which may sug-
gest that introducing new regulation to ensure that all creditors take part in debt restructurings 
is unnecessary. I argue that one of the reasons why relatively few creditors litigate against a 
defaulting sovereign is that the rules on sovereign immunity from attachment make it difficult 
in practice for creditors to execute a sovereign debt judgment. The most important findings 
showed that the number of sovereign defaults and restructurings has gone down in the last ten 
years, but that there has been an increase in default-related creditor litigation. At the same 
time, the overall number of sovereign debt restructurings and the average time required to 
conclude such restructurings is relatively low. This indicates that the contractual, market-
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based approach with voluntary restructurings has worked reasonably well in securing creditor 
participation and avoiding protracted negotiations. 245  
 
While chapter 3 deals with the situation prior to 2010, chapter 4 turns to legal developments 
since 2010. In the latter chapter, I examined certain legal proceedings and discussed whether 
these may have an impact on 1) the future participation of creditors in sovereign debt restruc-
turings and 2) the effectiveness of the examined legislation in handling the problems raised by 
these more recent developments. The focus of this chapter was on the outcome of litigation 
before the New York District Court and the International Centre for Investment Disputes (IC-
SID) in NML Capital, Ltd. V. the Republic of Argentina and Abaclat and Others v. Argentina 
respectively. I argue that the novel interpretation of the pari passu clause adopted by the New 
York District Court, and the injunction issued in relation to it, represent new and strong legal 
tools for minority creditors who seek to hold out from restructurings to obtain full repayment 
under a non-restructured loan agreement. According to the District Court’s interpretation, the 
pari passu clause gives holdout creditors a right to be paid in accordance with the non-
restructured loan agreement, if the debtor chooses to pay the creditors who have accepted a 
restructuring. When such a right is combined with an injunction that also binds third parties, 
such as the injunction issued by the District Court, the chances of holdout creditors succeed-
ing in their claims for full repayment will significantly improve. One of the findings in chap-
ter 3 was that sovereign immunity from attachment remains an important practical obstacle 
for creditors seeking to execute a sovereign judgment. I argue that the main reason why the 
pari passu interpretation, combined with a strong injunction binding third parties, is such a 
forceful tool is the fact that the injunction circumvents these rules on sovereign immunity. 
 
In examining Belgian and UK legislation in chapter 4, I found that they have a limited effect 
on the increased incentives to hold out from sovereign debt restructurings introduced by the 
NML Capital case. Because CACs, like the pari passu clause, are contractual provisions, they 
are able to bind minority creditors in sovereign debt restructurings and deter sovereign debt 
litigation. Increased implementation of CACs, and strengthening of CACs themselves, may 
correct the increased incentives for creditors to hold out from sovereign debt restructurings 
that are introduced by the District Court’s ruling in the NML Capital case. A 2013 IMF report 
on sovereign debt restructuring supports my conclusion that there has been an increase in in-
centives for creditors to hold out by stating that ‘[t]he ongoing Argentina litigation has exac-
erbated the collective action problem, by increasing leverage of holdout creditors’.246 In the 
same report, the IMF also admits that ‘while creditor participation has been adequate in recent 
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restructurings, the current contractual, market-based approach to debt restructuring is becom-
ing less potent in overcoming collective action problems, especially in pre-default cases’.247 
One of the solutions put forward by the IMF to overcome the problems that have arisen as a 
consequence of these legal developments is to strengthen CACs with a single limb voting 
procedure. It is more difficult for creditors to obtain a blocking position when there are no 
requirements for a majority in favour of restructuring within each series, but only on an ag-
gregated basis. For this reason, and as discussed in section 3.3.3.1, an aggregated single-limb 
voting procedure is likely to improve the chances of successful debt restructuring. 
 
The IMF report does not discuss the legal consequences of the rulings in certain sovereign 
debt disputes before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
After the Argentine default, sovereign debt disputes were brought before ICSID and for the 
first time ICSID accepted jurisdiction over such disputes. Whether or not ICSID will accept 
disputes over sovereign debt (sovereign bonds) in the future remains unsettled, but if it does I 
argue that it may disrupt the current system of sovereign debt restructuring, which relies on a 
voluntary contractual approach. The reason for this is that when ICSID handles a dispute, it 
considers whether or not there has been a breach of an investment treaty. In doing this it may 
disregard contractual terms, such as CACs, and it may therefore also end up invalidating a 
restructuring agreement made on the basis of CACs. Of the three legislative initiatives exam-
ined in this thesis, I concluded that the euro area Model CAC is the most potent legislation 
with respect to limiting the problem of creditors holding out from restructuring processes and 
litigating for full payment. As previously explained, the IMF, ICMA and the EU through the 
euro area Model CAC, rely primarily on CACs to reduce the collective action problems dur-
ing debt restructurings and holdout litigation. Recourse to ICSID arbitration in sovereign debt 
disputes may thus create a legal gap in the international community’s efforts to limit the prob-
lem of minority creditors holding out from restructuring processes.
248
 In addition to weaken-
ing the existing tools that contributes to limiting hold out problems, a situation in which IC-
SID accepts jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes may also further strengthen the incen-
tive for creditors to hold out from restructuring processes because 1) the equal treatment fea-
tures, which are important parts of investment treaties, may make it more difficult for credi-
tors to agree on a restructuring offer, and 2) because ICSID awards are deemed easier to exe-
cute compared to national and municipal judgments and other arbitral awards. With this in 
mind, I argue that the legal developments in the aftermath of the Argentine default in 2001 
and the subsequent litigation, have led to a situation where the incentives to take part in re-
structuring processes have been weakened.  
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With respect to the legislation examined in chapter 3, I conclude that the legislation in Bel-
gium and the UK will probably not be affected if ICSID starts to accept jurisdiction over sov-
ereign debt disputes. Given that an ICSID tribunal can disregard a CAC, however, it is clear 
that the euro area Model CAC may become less effective.   
 
To sum up, in my thesis I conclude that legislation in both Belgium and the UK is quite nar-
row and does not manage (or even attempt) to affect the overall incentives for minority credi-
tors to participate in sovereign debt restructurings and not litigate for full payment under the 
original non- restructured loan agreement. The euro area Model CAC, though it could be 
strengthened in various ways, is a more comprehensive tool and may significantly improve 
the likelihood of obtaining a successful restructuring. However, the legal developments that 
have taken place in the sphere of sovereign debt disputes since 2010 have disrupted the volun-
tary system of sovereign debt restructurings. I argue that the legal developments (the pari pas-
su interpretation, the injunction and the possibility of ICSID accepting jurisdiction over sov-
ereign debt disputes) have strengthened the creditor’s right to hold out from sovereign debt 
restructurings and claim full payment. Even CACs, believed to be the most potent tool to deal 
with holdout behaviour and free-riding during sovereign debt restructurings, are in danger of 
losing their effectiveness.  
 
Compared to international trade, international finance is subject to very little international 
regulation. The analysis in this thesis shows that the sphere of sovereign debt is quite complex 
and fragmented, and that it is difficult to establish national rules that are capable of respond-
ing to international challenges. The main observation that can be drawn from my thesis is that 
there seems to be a need for stronger international cooperation to deal with the problem of 
holdout creditors in sovereign debt restructurings.  
 
5.2 Recommendations and Further Research  
Sovereign debtors, creditors and academics are all concerned about the future of sovereign 
lending and restructurings. Concern has grown especially in the aftermath of the NML Capital 
case because the consequences now also impact the majority creditors who took part in the 
restructurings. Several actors are now engaged in finding new solutions to the challenges 
posed by minority creditors holding out and which are in danger of disrupting the voluntary 
system of sovereign debt restructuring. 
 
Based on the findings in my thesis I will propose some initiatives which could contribute to 
limiting holdout behaviour and enhance the likelihood of achieving successful sovereign debt 
restructuring: 
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- Increased implementation of CACs in sovereign bonds. The implementation of CACs 
in developed economies’ sovereign bonds is also important, because it can contribute 
to making CACs a market standard.  
- CACs should be strengthened so that they use a single-limb voting procedure, in ac-
cordance with the recommendations of the IMF and ICMA. 
- Sovereign bonds should specify the content of the pari passu clause, so that it cannot 
be interpreted in the same way it was interpreted by the New York District Court. The 
ICMA has suggested such a standard pari passu clause.
249
 
- To ensure that sovereign bonds and sovereign debt disputes are not subject to the ju-
risdiction of ICSID in the future, governments can implement a ‘carve out clause’ in 
their Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). This clause should state that sovereign 
bonds are not to be considered as investments under the BIT or the ICSID conven-
tion.
250
  
- Thought should be given to the idea of establishing an international sovereign debt re-
structuring mechanism, for example through the General Assembly’s Ad hoc Commit-
tee on sovereign debt restructuring processes.
251
 
 
To overcome future challenges regarding the resolution of sovereign debt crises in general, 
and holdout problems during debt restructurings more particularly, further research should be 
undertaken on the question of ICSID and its jurisdiction over sovereign debt disputes. Such 
research is especially important because sovereign debt cases concerning ICSID’s jurisdiction 
are still pending and a future award may lead to clarification of the legal situation. The pro-
cess of the General Assembly’s Ad hoc Committee on sovereign debt restructuring, and the 
different suggestions for establishing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism should also be 
further examined. The same applies to the practice of aggressive holdout creditors, so called 
vulture funds, in order to create effective measures limiting the negative consequences of their 
behaviour. 
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